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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores the domestic consequences of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) program lending. It argues that when governments implement austerity 
reforms attached to IMF loans it increases human rights violations and violence in 
borrower governments. A new measure of IMF compliance is developed and used to 
explore the consequences of IMF lending in the 21st century. Past research exploring 
IMF lending consequences has assumed compliance away. While IMF program lending 
is largely seen as a failure there is significant debate about the causes of failure. Human 
rights scholars have argued that austerity policies impose significant hardships on citizens 
in borrower governments. International organization scholars and political economists 
have pointed to low compliance with reforms as a cause of negative outcomes. While 
both of these literatures use compliance as the causal mechanism neither directly tests 
whether reforms are being met. Compliance with IMF austerity is measured for all 93 
IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2015. Empirical models are used to test whether IMF 
compliance leads to: increased government violations of collective labor rights, increased 
violent anti-government protests, and increased repression of physical integrity rights. I 
find that as compliance with IMF austerity increases labor rights respect declines, violent 
protests increase, and repression increases. While compliance on average is low, the 
findings here suggest that if governments implemented all of the reforms that the IMF 
asks for, global labor rights violation, domestic violence, and repression would 
significantly increase across the globe.   
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Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been criticized for undermining 
human rights and contributing to political instability. Austerity policies, which the IMF 
requires in exchange for loans, are increasingly seen as unsuitable to citizens and policy 
makers. IMF programs have a poor track record of promoting economic growth and have 
been criticized for increasing economic rights violations. These relationships have 
become painfully clear in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis as several 
developed countries (such as Portugal, Ireland, and Greece) were forced to take out IMF 
loans. Leaders in all three countries protested that IMF austerity was too harsh, harmed 
citizens, and undermined political stability. These protests are the same that developing 
countries have been making for decades. The case of Greece has proved particularly 
informative. 
Greece took out an IMF loan in 2010 to address growing debt and negative 
economic growth. Far from generating growth, Greece has since negotiated multiple IMF 
loans and been under program lending for 8 consecutive years. Greece nearly exited the 
European Union in its attempt to renegotiate the economic reforms attached to these 
loans. These reforms were extremely unpopular at home. Greek labor unions decried that 
IMF austerity was an attack on workers and labor rights. Teachers and students rallied 
against cuts to education spending. Farmers protested cuts to farming subsidies and tax 
hikes. Anarchists, communists, and other leftist groups organized against austerity as a 
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reform strategy. These groups collectively engaged in 149 violent and non-violent 
protests between 2010 and 2015.  
Hundreds of thousands of citizens repeatedly took to the streets expressing 
grievances with the economic reforms that the IMF had asked for and the government 
agreed to. Many of these protests turned violent, leading to property damage, 
confrontations with police, and death. Media images capturing these protests look more 
like war zones than the capital of a developed OECD country. Police have responded by 
using tear gas and beatings to repress violent and non-violent protesters alike.  
In 2015, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, the United Nations Independent Expert on 
foreign debt and human rights, urged International Financial Institutions to reconsider the 
effect of lending reforms on human rights. Speaking of IMF austerity in Greece, 
Bohoslavsky said: 
 “The harsh conditionalities of the Greek adjustment programme 
have resulted in severe cut-backs in social spending, health care and 
education, raising concerns about the ability of the Greek government to 
ensure basic economic and social rights.”1 
 
“[F]urther adjustment policies should respect the human rights 
obligations that are binding not only for the Government of Greece, but as 
well for the creditor countries and lending institutions. There is real legal 
risk that some of the harsh austerity measures could be incompatible with 
European and international human rights law.”2 
 
 This critique of IMF austerity is quite severe. In the first quote, Bohoslavsky 
argues that the implementation of IMF austerity has undermined government respect for 
even the most basic economic and social rights. If a developed country under IMF 
                                                      
1 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2015 
2 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2015a 
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austerity cannot protect economic and social rights then there is little hope for developing 
countries under similar lending agreements. The second quote is even more pointed as he 
argues that IMF austerity may be incompatible with international human rights law. This 
has been echoed by scholars who argue that austerity policies are fundamentally 
incompatible with human rights protections.3 This suggests that governments which 
implement austerity may violate international human rights law in the process. 
 The crisis exposed deep rooted cleavages among EU members which undermined 
the unified European experiment that the EU represents. Other EU members and their 
citizens blamed Greece. A Pew Global report found that citizens in EU member countries 
listed Greeks as the “laziest and most incompetent in the EU”, while Greeks saw 
themselves as the most hardworking.4 Media coverage of Greece in the United Kingdom 
and Germany has had strong anti-Greek biases.5 Rather than harsh austerity, these 
critiques saw the Greek government as unwilling to make necessary economic reforms. 
Divides in the Eurozone over bailouts have activated strong nationalist sentiments and 
polarization within countries.6 That so many see Greeks as lazy ignores the human 
suffering that often accompanies austerity. As a result, anti-Greek sentiment threatens to 
destroy the entire EU project. 
 Criticisms of this type have been levied against IMF borrowers in the past. 
Complaints that austerity is too harsh and will cause serious societal problems are often 
                                                      
3 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Elson and Balakrishnan 2011; Blanton and Peksen 2016 
4 Thompson 2012 
5 Pavlakis 2013 
6 Hellwig 2011; Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014 
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met with deft indifference from the IMF and Western states. Egypt serves as one 
example. In 1977, President Anwar Sadat agreed to remove subsidies on gas, sugar, rice, 
and bread. He had spent years arguing that the removal of these subsidies would generate 
widespread backlash, but the IMF insisted. The removal of these subsidies immediately 
triggered the “bread riots”, which were some of the worst riots in Egyptian history, and 
which threatened to engulf the country in civil conflict.7 Sadat came to be seen as a leader 
who had sold out to the West. This culminated in his assassination in 1981 by Islamic 
extremists. Venezuela under President Carlos Andres Perez is another example.  Perez, a 
socialist who campaigned on an anti-austerity platform, signed up for an IMF loan in 
1989.   This resulted in substantial losses in credibility and many cite this as paving the 
way for Hugo Chavez’s rise to power. Finally, in 2001 the IMF cut off Argentina’s 
access to lending as it alleged that the government of Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001) 
had failed to implement sufficient reforms. Despite this critique, the reforms that were 
enacted had caused widespread riots and chaos eventually forcing Rua and three 
subsequent presidents from office. 
 Greek complaints against austerity differ in that they come from one of seven 
developed countries which have borrowed from the IMF in the 21st century. In Ireland 
and Portugal austerity caused hundreds of thousands to take to the street. Citizens 
complained that austerity had forced many into poverty and unemployment. Protests 
resulted in violent clashes with police.8 But, Ireland and Portugal differ from Greece 
                                                      
7 Hillal Dessouki 1981 
8 Information about protests and police clashes in Ireland and Portugal is taken from the Mass Mobilization 
protest dataset.  
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because they spent much less time under IMF lending and each only took out a single 
loan (both took out an Extended Fund Facility which lasted approximately four years).9 
Had they stayed under longer, violence likely would have continued. 
Greece was not as fortunate and has taken out multiple loans from the IMF since 
2010. The Syrian civil war also led to large inflows of refugees to Greece, which 
overwhelmed state capacity. Nationalist sentiment increased as Greeks saw themselves as 
isolated and condemned by other EU countries. Anti-refugee violence surged as Greeks 
complained that the government was spending money on refugees while forcing Greeks 
into poverty.10 EU countries provided little in the way of refugee funding while 
condemning the Greek government for failing to implement austerity reforms. In many 
ways, Greece under IMF lending was forced to balance weak state capacity with 
increasing social conflict based on societal cleavages, while still garnering little sympathy 
from the IMF and Western states.  
 Under IMF lending, Greece has seen its labor rights decline, violent protests 
increase, and repression of citizens increases. This experience matches those in Egypt, 
Venezuela, and Argentina under IMF lending. This dissertation explores how IMF 
austerity impacts labor rights, violent protest, and repression. Before discussing these 
relationships, it is necessary to outline what the International Monetary Fund, what 
austerity is, and why compliance with IMF lending is important for testing whether these 
relationships are anecdotal or evidence of something systematic. 
 
                                                      
9 This data comes from the SCIP dataset developed by the author. 
10 Mass Mobilization dataset 
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International Monetary Fund Austerity 
The IMF was formed during WWII as an international organization whose aim 
was to address balance of payment problems and facilitate a more open international 
economic system. Today, nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF. 
Each member country contributes a portion of currency on reserve, which helps fund IMF 
activities. The amount of currency on reserve determines voting power as well as the 
amount that a country is eligible to borrow. The United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
Germany, and France contribute the largest shares and control over a third of the voting 
power in the IMF. However, the overwhelming majority of loans are made to developing 
countries. When a member country faces an economic crisis, the IMF can act as a lender 
of last resort.  
 In order to receive a loan, the IMF asks for a set of initial reforms (prior actions).  
Requesting initial reforms helps screen out countries that are unlikely to comply with 
reforms. Once these initial reforms have been implemented, the IMF officially agrees to 
lend that country money. A loan is given in tranches, each of which includes a set of 
conditions which must be enacted in order for the money to continue to be disbursed. 
IMF conditionality is meant to ensure that reform takes place and to prevent the IMF 
from simply subsidizing the policies which led to economic trouble in the first place. 
Programs are designed by the IMF staff along with the Finance Minister and the 
executive branch in recipient countries. As long as a country has implemented the 
necessary conditions, then the loan continues to be disbursed.  
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 IMF programs are aimed at economic reform as well as ensuring that loans are 
repaid. Each loan has a number of policies which are evaluated by the IMF Executive 
Board: ranging from as few as 1 condition (Macedonia in 2011 and 2012) to as many as 
32211 (Jamaica in 2015). These policies cover a range of different areas. Some policies 
are aimed at fiscal reform, trade, and finance while others cover labor markets, social 
spending, and transparency. Over time, the IMF has increased the scope of policies 
covered by loans leading to mission creep.12 Critics often argue that the IMF does not 
have the expertise to recommend reforms outside of the traditional balance of payment 
issues for which it was founded.    
The IMF does not exist simply as a technocratic organization promoting the best 
economic reforms for each case. IMF programs are subject to politics from both 
international and domestic actors. While the IMF almost always get repaid13, compliance 
with reforms is low.14 This has led many to explore the role of politics in IMF lending. 
 IMF member states may pressure the IMF to help allies or strategically important 
countries. Many voting decisions within the IMF require an 85% majority. The United 
States controls over 16% of the voting power giving it a veto over important lending 
decisions. The United States has used this influence to alter lending decisions when it 
suits their interests.15 In these cases, countries may have an easier time gaining, or may 
                                                      
11 This does not refer to 322 unique conditions. Rather it is the number of policies which have been 
evaluated by the Executive Board, with some policies being evaluated more than once.  
12 Kentilikelenis, King, and Stubbs 2016 
13 Dreher 2009 
14 Bird and Willett 2004; Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009; Bas and Stone 2014  
15 Stone 2004, 2008, 2011; Dreher et al. 2015 
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continue receiving, a loan despite non-compliance with IMF conditionality. The IMF also 
seems unwilling to cut off loans to countries which fail to implement reforms.16 This 
causes countries to become dependent on IMF loans and to expect these loans whenever 
they face trouble.17  
Domestically, leaders bargain with the IMF to limit policies which may be 
unpopular.18 For example, if a leader expects resistance from unions, then they negotiate 
for fewer labor conditions.19 Even with negotiations, leaders are still stuck with austerity 
reforms which are likely to harm citizens, and not all leaders oppose such reforms. 
Leaders may use IMF programs to bypass domestic political and institutional 
constraints.20 This helps elites in a country push through reforms which otherwise might 
have failed. Blanton et al. (2015; 2015a) argue that during times of economic crisis, the 
power of labor is weak relative to capital and this allows leaders to enact reforms which 
further weaken labor. These can be seen as shortcomings of the IMF as an International 
Organization. Lending is biased by politics, poor lending choices, and leaders who use 
the IMF as cover.   
 In light of evidence that IMF programs often fail to promote growth21, it is not 
surprising that there are also negative socio-economic consequences. Recent evidence 
                                                      
16 Vreeland 2006 
17 Noy 2008; Dreher 2009 
18 Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012 
19 Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012 
20 Smith and Vreeland 2006 
21 For an overview of this literature see Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Dreher 2006, 2009; Bas and Stone 
2014 Moosa 2018.  
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reaffirms the negative relationship between IMF programs and economic rights.22 Yet 
much of this literature uses data that is nearly two decades old. Abouharb and Cingranelli 
(2007) show a negative relationship between both IMF and World Bank programs and 
labor rights, economic rights, peace, and respect for physical integrity rights between 
1981 and 2003. Yet, the IMF has undergone significant reforms in the 21st century. The 
IMF has streamlined conditionality23, increased its work with domestic civil society 
groups24 and made renewed efforts to minimize the negative consequence of IMF 
programs on society in general.25 New lending instruments aimed at reducing poverty and 
protecting social welfare spending floors have also been developed in the 21st century. 
This presents a wrinkle to the prevailing literature. First, it begs the question of 
whether the negative outcomes of IMF programs, such poor growth or human rights 
violations, are the result of compliance with IMF austerity or lack of compliance. The 
debate between various critics is in many ways uninformed. While the structural reforms 
and austerity promoted by the IMF are generally understood, there is little evidence of 
compliance that is not anecdotal.26 There is almost no systematic evaluation of how 
compliance affects outcomes of interest. Advocates of austerity hold faith-like belief that 
the market is the protector of freedom; critics of austerity believe it is its greatest threat. 
                                                      
22 see Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015 
23 IMF 2007, 2009 
24 IMF 2016 
 
25 Blanchard, Jaumotte, and Loungani 2013 
26 Vreeland 2006 
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 The next section outlines two economic recovery strategies: stimulus spending 
and austerity. The counterfactual for IMF austerity is what would have happened had a 
country chosen an alternative set of reforms such as stimulus spending or some 
combination of the two (i.e. less austerity with counter-cyclical spending). The role of the 
IMF in promoting a specific set of reforms is also important. IMF austerity did not 
develop out of thin air but was the result of a changing international economic order and 
debates regarding economic theory. 
Two Theories of Economic Recovery 
When countries have economic trouble, their economies may face a sudden 
downturn leading to a contraction of the economy, which is defined as a decrease in 
Gross Domestic Product. If this contraction lasts for six months it is a recession, if it lasts 
for several years it is a depression, which is a form of economic crisis. Economic crises 
can be caused by runs on banks, unsustainable debt, inflation, and capital flight. A crisis 
may exist in a single country or can affect a set of countries. In some cases economic 
crises spread and become a global issue. Most recently, the 2007-2008 global financial 
crisis affected nearly every country on the globe many of which have still not recovered. 
The panic of 1873, the great depression of 1929, the great stagflation of 1973, and the 
Asian crisis of 1997 are other historical instances of large scale financial crises. There are 
countless other instances of economic crisis that were regional or specific to a single 
country. Governments must decide which set of reforms to enact in order to respond to 
the crisis. While there are many reforms that can be enacted, I simplify economic reform 
into two strategies. One strategy is to cut spending (austerity) and the other is to increase 
11 
 
spending (stimulus). Which strategy leaders choose is often a function of both domestic 
and international politics. 
Economic reform has been a domestic issue for most of human history. After 
WWII, the international community created a number of International Organizations 
meant to promote economic stability. International Financial Institutions were developed 
to help countries facing economic problems and overcome collective action problems 
which prevented cooperation between states. International Organizations and 
international agreements make protectionism more costly and can help states weather 
crisis while avoiding protectionist policies. The IMF, World Bank, and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helped fund and co-ordinate economic policy 
between and within countries.  
When the IMF was created, there was significant debate about what role it would 
play and how much funding it would have. John Maynard Keynes, a British economist, 
played a prominent role in the creation of the IMF alongside American economist Harry 
Dexter White. The IMF was designed as a lender of last resort, but Keynes and White 
disagreed on whether the burden of adjustment should fall entirely on debtors (White) or 
whether there should be constraints on creditors as well (Keynes).27 White won out, but 
the outcome of this debate had a large impact on how the IMF was designed and funded. 
Had Keynes won, the IMF, and the policies it recommends, would look very different 
today. 
In the years since it was created, the IMF has undergone significant reforms in an 
attempt to keep up with the times. IMF lending was originally aimed at Europe in the 
                                                      
27 Buttonwood 2014 
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post war era. Over time, lending shifted to developing countries and conditionality 
expanded in scope and depth. Reforms to the IMF continue as program lending adapts to 
critics who argue the IMF should punish countries which do not impose austerity as well 
as critics who argue the IMF focuses too much on creditors rather than the welfare of the 
poor.28 The IMF as an institution has increasingly called for austerity, but this is not the 
only set of reforms it could advocate. Both stimulus and austerity are outlined below. 
In the wake of the Great Depression of 1929, the United States chose to increase 
government spending. In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt launched The New Deal, 
which constituted a number of federal reforms that pumped money into the economy. The 
government wanted to reduce the budget but found that it needed to increase spending in 
order to fund economic recovery programs, a practice known commonly as stimulus 
spending. Stimulus spending is one strategy that governments have used to boost 
economic production. By pumping money into the economy, the government can boost 
demand for goods and services. As demand rises, businesses expand to meet new demand 
and investors spend money to fund those expansions. As businesses expand, jobs are 
created and workers spend their money on goods and services, which in turn creates more 
demand. John Maynard Keynes is probably the most well know advocate of stimulus 
spending as a response to economic crisis.29  Keynesian economic theory has fallen to the 
wayside since the 1970s but remains an important and often misunderstood theory 
                                                      
28 Buttonwood 2014 
29 Keynes 2016 
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today.30 Keynes’ logic justified United States and European Union stimulus packages in 
the wake of 2007 and is still advocated by economists like Nobel prize winner Paul 
Krugman.31   
 A second strategy focuses on reducing government spending, which is known as 
austerity. Austerity aims to significantly reduce government spending in an effort to 
control debt. Debt is seen as the primary impediment to economic growth and 
accumulates as a result of excessive government spending. Besides reducing debt, 
austerity policies seek to remove government involvement in the economy.32 By 
removing barriers such as tariffs and labor regulations, markets will be free to readjust, 
growth rates will increase, and the economy can recover.  These reforms create a more 
favorable climate for businesses and investors. By liberalizing the economy and reducing 
debt, austerity fosters robust economic growth which trickles down to benefit society as a 
whole. Reforms are harsh and costly in the short term but in the long run the country sees 
growth (often referred to as a J-curve). Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek are two of the 
most well-known advocates of what is today termed austerity.33 In the 1970s, austerity 
became the dominant economic recovery strategy promoted by International Financial 
Institutions like the IMF as well as powerful world leaders including Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher. These reforms mostly take place in the developing world as 
                                                      
30 See Krugman 2011 for a discussion of modern interpretations of “The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest, and Money” written by Keynes in 1936.    
31 Krugman 2014 
32 These policies may also be accompanied by increases in taxes 
33 Friedman 1990; Hayek 2007, 2014 
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developed countries have largely avoided austerity.34 In the 21st century, this has changed 
as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Latvia, Turkey, and Hungary are developed 
countries (OECD member states) under IMF lending.  
 The debate between stimulus and austerity is an important one to the discussion of 
IMF lending. Each can be seen as the counterfactual to the other. Empirical work by 
economists has found support for both. Each camp argues its case in an almost religious 
way. From an economic point of view, this debate has provided two strategies for 
promoting economic growth. While economic growth has historically been treated as the 
most important measure of economic well-being, it is very limited. Many economists 
today argue that human rights35 and other measures of human development like 
inequality, poverty, healthcare, and standard of living are more relevant indicators.36  
Austerity has been criticized for undermining human rights in exchange for 
unobservable benefits decades in the future. Keynes argued that the “long run is a 
misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set 
themselves too easy, too useless a task, if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us, 
that when the storm is long past, the ocean is flat again.”37 Keynes was skeptical of 
arguments which suggested that in the future the economy would grow. If it did grow, 
was this due to austerity? Or do economies naturally recover over time? How much 
suffering is it worth in the short run to achieve this aim? Human rights scholars make 
                                                      
34 The United Kingdom IMF loan in 1977 is a notable exception. As are Ireland, Portugal, and Greek IMF 
loans in the last ten years.  
35 Sen 2000 
36 See Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010 
37 Keynes 2000, p.80 
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similar arguments and to countries like Greece that exhibit a downward trend in human 
rights under austerity. They argue instead that reforms should ensure that human rights 
remain protected. Austerity advocates on the other hand are skeptical that short-run debt 
can lead to long-term growth. These scholars argue that countries would have been worse 
without IMF lending and negative consequences are either a short-term necessity or that 
conditions would have improved if reforms were implemented.38  
Debates over whether IMF austerity harms economic rights, causes violence, and 
leads to repression essentially boil down to a question about what the direct effect of 
austerity is on these outcomes. IMF compliance is levied by proponents of both stimulus 
reform (high compliance) and austerity reform (low compliance) as the causal 
explanation that proves their cause. This of course is in large part due to the fact that data 
on IMF compliance is largely missing, which makes it difficult to directly test any of 
these relationships.  
IMF Compliance 
Compliance has been at the center of scholarly and policy research on 
International Organizations for decades. The question of whether International 
Organizations and agreements alter state behavior is not a trivial one or an easy one to 
untangle. International Organizations can increase information, serve as signaling 
mechanisms, and impose costs for non-compliance.39 All of these should alter state 
behavior. On the other hand there is often a compliance deficit as international 
                                                      
38 Eriksen and De Soysa 2009 
39 Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; Chayes and Chayes 1993, Simmons 2000; Simmons and Hopkins 
2005; Konig and Mader 2014  
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agreements suffer from agency loss, ineffective monitoring, and non-punishment.40 Some 
form of non-compliance is often built into these agreements to make them flexible (for 
example escape clauses in trade agreements).41  
Studies of compliance have often been limited by the difficulty of determining 
whether state behavior was the result of compliance or whether states would have acted 
in the same way regardless.42 One of the limitations of this literature is often a lack of 
data on compliance. As a result, empirical studies have often used ratification, the 
presence of an institution, or membership in an international agreement as proxies, and 
looked at how state behavior changes for those who are bound by these institutions versus 
those who are not.43 This has been a particular problem for studying the consequences of 
IMF lending given the scarcity of systematic compliance data.44  
For much of the 20th century, information about IMF programs was not public. 
Many scholars had to come up with clever ways to measure compliance in light of this 
lack of transparency. Recently this has changed:  the IMF public database, Monitoring of 
Fund Arrangements (MONA) has provided a wealth of new information. However, the 
MONA database does not provide this information in a way that is readily available for 
quantitative analysis. This dissertation introduce a new disaggregated dataset on IMF 
compliance which is suitable for statistical analysis. 
                                                      
40 Stone 2011; Konig and Mader 2014 
41 Chayes and Chayes 1993; Rosendordd and Milner 2001; Gray and Slapin 2013 
42 Downs, Barsoom, and Rocke 1996; von Stein 2005; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2005 
43 For example Hafner-Burton 2005; Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007; Kim and Sikkink 2010 
44 Vreeland 2006 
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 Measuring compliance is not easy. Past studies have looked at a small number of 
cases or a single measure of compliance. Hagard (1985) looked at 30 loans made under 
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) from 1974-1984, and find that over half were canceled 
while the remaining countries complied with very few conditions. Polak (1991) found 
that compliance ranged from 40% to 60% for fiscal and credit targets. These studies 
alongside a number of others used internal IMF data to evaluate compliance and often 
found compliance was low.  
 A set of widely used measures for evaluating compliance capture whether loan 
tranches45  were disbursed.46 The logic is that, if a country failed to implement the 
necessary conditions, the IMF would withhold a tranche and a country could not access 
the next portion of the loan. This approach is quite clever and provides a readily available 
way to explore compliance. Furthermore, it provides a simple measure of whether a 
country has complied that can be used for statistical analysis. However, this measurement 
approach has a number of limitations. First, it assumes that if loans are disbursed, a 
country complied with the conditions of a loan. However, the literature has shown that 
decisions to withhold tranches and punish non-compliance is often a political one, and 
punishment is quite rare for allies of powerful member states.47 Second, a country whose 
economy had rebounded would no longer need the loan. By not drawing upon IMF funds 
they are coded as non-compliant even if they are still enacting reforms. Some loans are 
                                                      
45 Over the course of a loan the IMF executive board evaluates whether borrowing countries implemented 
the necessary reforms. If reforms were sufficient then the IMF releases then next portion of the loan to the 
borrowing country. Each portion is referred to as a tranche.  
46 Killick 1995, Dreher 2006 
47 See Stone 2004; Dreher 2009 
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also precautionary, with countries failing to ever draw funds because they are not needed. 
Alternative measures have included loan suspension, the number of policies in a loan, 
and number of years under IMF lending.48 None of these measures capture what scholars 
describe as compliance. At best, these are blunt measures. Scholars have found them 
frustratingly limited, but they have been the best available given the scarcity of 
information on IMF lending. 
This dissertation introduces an aggregate indicator of IMF compliance at the 
country-year level. I measure IMF compliance as the percent of IMF conditions evaluated 
by the IMF Executive Board that are considered to be met in a country-year. This is 
useful in that it provides a single measure of IMF compliance. It allows researchers to 
distinguish between low-compliance countries and high compliance countries. Better yet, 
it is continuous and provides greater variation in compliance than the dichotomous 
measures used in the past. However, this measure also has weaknesses. It assumes that all 
IMF conditions are the same despite the fact that some conditions are likely harder to 
implement than others. For example, it is harder for a loan recipient to privatize water 
than it is to collect monetary statistics, two possible conditions of an IMF loan. The 
human rights effects of these two conditions are also likely to be different. This measure 
is also not as useful for evaluating theories that rely on the implementation of a specific 
type of IMF condition. 80% compliance tells us nothing about which policies are 
included in that 80% and which are not. We can say that as the percentage of IMF 
compliance rises, the probability that theorized conditions are implemented rises as well. 
                                                      
48 Ivanoa et al. 2001; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007,2009; Pop-Eleches 2008; Dreher and Gassebner 
2012; Woo 2013 
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This measure is suited to testing theories concerning austerity as a policy package that 
contain multiple individual policies. While it is not perfect, it is a significant 
improvement over current measures in the literature. This measure also has plenty of 
variation between and within countries, which make it useful for empirical tests of 
theories in the literature.   
Figure 1 (below) shows compliance with IMF conditionality for 93 IMF 
borrowers between 2002 and 2015. The average country-year compliance is 
approximately 39%. This means that, on average, countries implement fewer than half of 
the conditions attached to IMF loans. The standard deviation is about 18%, which 
suggests that there is a lot of variation by country. The histogram below reflects this, as 
compliance is close to normally distributed. There are a few outliers at high levels of 
compliance (above 80%) and at low levels of compliance (at 0%). This data provides 
evidence that almost no countries comply with all of the conditions attached to IMF 
loans. Almost all countries do comply with some non-trivial percentage of IMF 
conditions. So while this data provides reason to be skeptical that compliance leads to 
negative outcomes, it also provides evidence that countries are implementing reforms. 
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Figure 2 (above) breaks compliance down by the amount of time a country has 
spent under IMF lending. There are a few interesting patterns here. First, the average 
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level of compliance is much lower in the first year of IMF lending. This makes sense 
because many conditions take time to implement. It also suggests that the level of 
compliance that a country is going to choose is much less certain in the first year. Second, 
high levels of compliance are rare and occur almost exclusively in the early years (years 
2 through 4) of IMF lending. Third, compliance over time, beginning in year 2 through 
year 12, is about the same, hovering between 35% and 45%. Most countries implement a 
below average number of conditions regardless of how long they have spent under 
program lending. This begs the question of whether the large number of IMF conditions 
come with the expectation that only around 40% will be met. The tails to these boxes are 
also quite large suggesting that there is significant variation between countries that have 
spent the same amount of time under IMF lending.  
Outline of this project 
 This project proceeds in five parts. This introduction serves as the first part. It has 
introduced a few country examples of IMF austerity and its potential consequences. The 
IMF as an International Organization has been discussed, as has the role of IMF austerity 
within the broader debate about what generates economic recovery. A new measure of 
compliance with IMF lending has been introduced and argued to be suitable for testing 
debates in the literature. The rest of this project will use this measure to test whether IMF 
austerity is responsible for labor rights violations, violent protest, and repression.  
The counterfactual is not what would have happened under stimulus spending, as 
there remains no systematic data on austerity versus stimulus spending for a global 
sample of countries. If austerity does indeed cause harm then an alternative economic 
recovery strategy should be considered. Stimulus spending serves as that alternative. 
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However, in this project the counterfactual is lower levels of austerity compliance. What 
would have happened to human rights and violence if a country had failed to enact 
reforms? Among IMF borrowers, do we see more positive outcomes among those who 
implement reforms or those who fail to implement reforms?   
 Chapter 2 explores how IMF austerity impacts labor rights. This chapter provides 
evidence that global respect for labor rights has been declining in the 21st century. IMF 
austerity provides one explanation this decline. Labor reforms, budget cuts, privatization, 
and free trade reforms are tied to factors that weaken labor, reduce the costs to firms for 
violating labor rights, and make it harder for workers to organize collectively. Rather 
than any single policy, austerity as a policy package is seen as mutually reinforcing. As 
the percent of austerity policies increase there is less room for leaders to compensate 
those who lose out from reform. I hypothesize that as the percentage of IMF conditions 
implemented increases, respect for collective labor rights will decrease. Low compliance, 
leader behavior, and IMF reforms in the 21st century are offered as explanations that may 
lead to a null finding; this counterfactual is used in subsequent chapters as well. 
Empirical evidence finds support for the hypothesis that IMF austerity undermines labor 
rights.  
 Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between IMF lending and violent protest. 
This chapter outlines three hypotheses. The first two hypotheses tie IMF austerity to 
grievances in society. Grievances are caused by the effects of austerity reforms as well as 
the perceived “unfairness” with the choice of reform. The first hypothesis tests whether 
violent protests are less common when IMF loans are from the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). These 
23 
 
loans are supposed to have pro-poor growth policies and social welfare spending floors 
built in and therefore should generate fewer grievances. The second hypothesis tests 
whether higher levels of compliance are associated with an increase in violent protest. 
The third hypothesis builds on theories of opportunity and protest cycles to argue that 
violent protests are large at the start of IMF lending but decrease in the years after. 
Violence can resurface as the effects of reforms are felt over time or countries sign up for 
new loans and agree to additional austerity. Thus, violent protest follows a cyclical 
relationship with time under IMF lending. Empirical tests support hypothesis 2 and 3 but 
find little support for hypothesis 1.  
Chapter 4 studies the relationship between IMF austerity and government 
repression of physical integrity rights. Repression is hypothesized to increase under IMF 
lending as a function of three mechanisms. First, cuts to police and military budgets can 
cause grievances among state agents who may use repression to supplement their income 
or as an emotional response to an increased workload and decreased standard of living. 
Second, grievances among citizens increase the amount of dissent, such as violent protest 
as argued in chapter 2. Dissent increases threats to leader power. As the size of these 
threats increases, the use of repression becomes more likely. Finally, IMF austerity taxes 
state capacity. With a restricted budget, and a large set of reforms to implement, leaders 
must use their political capital on compliance leaving few tools to address dissent. 
Repression becomes more likely as other policy tools are restricted. Empirical tests find 
show that repression increases as compliance with IMF lending increases.  
This project represents an important advance in the current literature. It speaks to 
how International Organizations can affect domestic policy. It speaks to the relationship 
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between compliance with international agreements and domestic politics. It also provides 
evidence that austerity as an economic reform strategy causes significant societal harm. 
Finally, it provides evidence in support of human rights scholars who have long argued 
that IMF program lending is incompatible with the protection of human rights. While the 
IMF may suffer from other institutional shortcomings, this project provides evidence that 
austerity as a reform strategy causes a wide array of societal problems that likely 
undermine IMF efforts at promoting recovery.  
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Chapter 1:  IMF Compliance and Labor Rights in the 21st Century 
 
 The Greek government has been under IMF program lending since 2010. In 
exchange for several bailouts the IMF has asked for significant reforms including: cuts to 
pensions, minimum wage freezes, dismantling collective bargaining agreements, cuts to 
social welfare policies, and the privatization of state enterprises. IMF austerity reforms 
are also known as conditionality: measures that significantly cut government budgets and 
promote neoliberal reforms. Austerity is unpopular in Greece and has sparked over a 
hundred anti-austerity protests and brought the far-left Syriza party to power for the first 
time in history.49 One of the largest criticisms of IMF austerity is the harm it causes to 
labor rights and workers; dismantling in a few years what the Greek labor movement took 
decades to win. US State Department reports on Human Rights in Greece show a marked 
decline in respect for labor rights between 2010 and 2015. Labor rights had been 
improving prior to 2010, but by 2015 anti-union discrimination, gender discrimination, 
child labor, and forced labor were on the rise, with unions and protesters placing the 
blame on IMF austerity.50  
There is increasing evidence that austerity as an economic recovery package has 
been a bust. In 2013 the IMF admitted that austerity had caused significant damage to 
                                                      
49 Data is taken from the Mass Mobilization protest dataset developed by Regan and Clark 2016 
50 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2015, 2010 
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Greece (economically, politically, and socially) and failed to help the economy recover.51 
An IMF study in 2016 by three prominent IMF economists found that austerity had failed 
to deliver growth and had significantly increased global inequality and instability both of 
which undermine growth.52 In the scholarly literature IMF lending is largely seen as a 
failure, at best having no effect and at worst undermining growth and human rights.53 
While most agree that IMF lending has been a failure, the cause of this failure is heavily 
disputed. This paper addresses this dispute in the context of labor rights. 
 The IMF has long been accused of promoting a set of reforms that harm labor 
rights.54 These reforms have also been tied to a host of other negative societal outcomes 
such as: increased poverty and inequality,55 negative health and education outcomes,56 
increased violations of women’s rights,57 and increased repression.58 In most of this 
literature compliance with IMF austerity is the cause of negative outcomes as these 
policies undermine human rights respect.  Scholars of international organizations and 
political economy have argued that poor outcomes are the result of low compliance and 
adverse selection. The IMF continues to lend to governments which do not implement 
reforms. If governments had enacted the difficult but necessary reforms then we would 
                                                      
51 Elliot, Inman, and Smith 2013 
52 Elliot 2016 
53 See Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009; Moosa 2018 
54 See for example, Vreeland 2002; Abouharb & Cingranelli 2007; Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015 
55 Oberdabernig 2013; Garuda 2000 
56 Rowden 2008, 2013; Marphatia 2009; Kentikelenis, King, and Stuckler 2015 
57 Detraz and Peksen 2016 
58 Pion-Berlin 1983; Keith and Poe 2000; Abouharb & Cingranelli 2007, 2009 
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have seen better outcomes.59 For these scholars, non-compliance with IMF austerity is the 
cause of negative outcomes. 
These two narratives are separated by a critical but untested assumption 
surrounding compliance with IMF conditionality. In both sets of arguments compliance is 
systematically missing from the empirical analysis despite being the causal mechanism 
driving these theories. A direct test of the relationship between compliance with IMF 
austerity and outcomes of interest is missing from the literature. This is due to data 
limitations as measures of compliance are rare (outside of small samples) or too blunt.  
This paper moves the debate forward by introducing a measure of compliance 
with IMF conditionality to test how compliance affects government respect for collective 
labor rights. Using a partial proportional odds model on a sample of 74 IMF borrowers 
between 2002 and 2015, I find support for the hypothesis that greater compliance leads to 
declines in respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
Labor Rights in the 21st Century 
Labor rights represent the rights that workers have in the workplace and govern 
employer-employee relations. Government protection of labor rights is indirect unlike 
many other human rights. Labor rights require the government to mediate the relationship 
between employers and employees. In the case of private employers, the government acts 
as a referee. In public employment the government is both a referee and the employer. 
Labor rights apply to anyone with any desire to work in a job that pays well, is fulfilling, 
dignified, and provides a feeling of societal contribution.60 Where labor rights are 
                                                      
59 Eriksen and de Soysa 2009; Stone 2011; Bas and Stone 2014   
60 Harvey 1993, 2005; Standing 2010, 2014; Sarkin and Koenig 2011 
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respected we are more likely to see a strong middle class, democratic institutions, and the 
protection of other human rights.61  
Labor rights are outlined in international human rights documents including: The 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
Employees have the right to unionize and bargain collectively, to equal pay and non-
discrimination, freedom from forced and child labor, among many others. While labor 
rights are often vaguely worded and hard to define, the definitions have been significantly 
narrowed over time by the ILO in 189 conventions and 205 recommendations. 62 The 
concept of progressive realization provides a useful analytic tool for determining whether 
governments are protecting labor rights. Progressive realization is the concept that respect 
for economic rights should improve over time and that states must use the maximum 
resources available to this end.63 This suggests that even if a country has poor respect for 
labor rights we should see improvements over time. Labor rights should be improving 
across the globe both as a function of progressive realization and as the human rights 
regime plays a larger role on state behavior. 64, 65  
                                                      
61 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007 
62 See Harvey 1993; Harvey 2005; Sarkin and Koenig 2011 
63 Fukuda-Par, Lawson-Remer & Randolph 2009 
64 Ibid 
65 See for example Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Semb 2000; Murdie and Davis 2012; Donnelly 2013  
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In this paper I focus on government respect for collective labor rights because the 
most recent work on IMF programs and labor rights has focused on these rights and 
because collective labor rights should lead to improvements in other labor rights. I define 
collective labor rights as the right to form unions without discrimination (freedom of 
association) and the right to bargain collectively and strike. Despite the growth of the 
human rights regime, labor rights have not been improving. 
Labor rights have been declining since the 1980s.66 Figure 1 below shows respect 
for labor rights between 2000 and 2014. Collective labor rights in practice is an additive 
index composed of respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining. Each of 
these measures is discrete and ranges from 0 (no respect) to 2 (full respect). After adding 
them together collective labor rights practices ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values 
indicating greater government respect for collective labor rights.67 The solid smoothed 
trend line plots the global average government labor rights respect over time. The dotted 
line shows the linear trend between labor rights and time. This graph shows that over the 
course of the 21st century respect for collective labor rights have declined globally. This 
decline is quite significant and began long before the global recession of 2007-2008. The 
trend line shows a clear negative relationship. Labor rights have been declining despite 
the requirement of progressive realization and increasing legitimacy of the human rights 
regime. This paper identifies one cause of this decline: the implementation of IMF 
austerity. 
                                                      
66 See Figure 2 in Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009, p.682 
67 Data is taken from the forthcoming WORKER Rights dataset developed by Barry, Clay, and Cingranelli. 
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IMF Austerity 
IMF conditionality encompasses a broad set of neoliberal economic policies 
aimed at reducing government spending, privatizing state owned enterprising, removing 
barriers to trade and capital mobility, reducing government size, as well as increasing 
labor market flexibility. As a whole, conditionality aims to remove government 
intervention in the market which in turn is meant to promote economic growth. These 
reforms are designed to address perceived structural problems in the country that 
undermine economic growth and development. Successful completion of reforms should 
therefore help countries recover from economic trouble and attract investment from 
36 
 
market actors.68 The empirical literature however has largely shown that IMF austerity 
has at best had no impact and at worst slowed growth.69 
IMF austerity has also been tied to a variety of negative societal outcomes. On top 
of failing to promote economic recovery, IMF lending has been associated with increased 
poverty and inequality,70 negative health and education outcomes,71 increased violations 
of women’s rights,72 and increased repression.73 The literature tying IMF conditionality 
to increased violations of labor rights is particularly large.74 These literatures tend to 
point to the hardships that IMF reforms place on citizens. The poor, women, children, 
minorities, and other vulnerable groups in society tend to pay the costs of reform rather 
than business or capital. This literature points to the policies contained in IMF 
agreements as well as the larger policy package as a source for creating hardships and 
conditions that make human rights violations more likely. These studies assume that 
countries are implementing the policies theorized to cause these human rights violations.  
None of these actually test the relationship between compliance in large part 
because there is almost no systematic data on compliance. Where this data does exist, it is 
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Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015; Detraz and Peksen 2016  
37 
 
in small samples or on a small number of conditions.75 This lack of data on IMF 
compliance has led scholars to attempt to use more advanced statistical techniques to 
account for compliance.76 These approaches have introduced additional assumptions and 
are far less accessible to the scholarly and policy communities. A simpler approach as 
advocated here is to measure compliance directly.  
 One criticism levied at the human rights and IMF literature is that compliance is 
notoriously low.77 Most countries under IMF lending implement very few of the 
conditions. Figure 2 above shows the distribution of compliance with IMF conditionality. 
The x-axis shows the percentage of IMF conditionality that a country implemented in a 
year. The y-axis shows the frequency of country-years at each level of implementation. In 
                                                      
75 Vreeland 2006 
76 See for example Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009; Bas and Stone 2014 
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any given year countries only comply with an average of 39% of the conditions that are 
evaluated by the IMF Executive Board. There are also very few countries which 
implement more than 70% of conditions in an IMF loan. Similarly, there are quite a few 
observations with no implementation (0%). Low compliance has therefore been one 
reason that these studies have been suspect. An alternative argument is that rather than 
IMF policies, governments which are not serious about reform are the ones who sign up. 
They do not enact reforms and violate labor rights and the IMF takes the blame. Given 
the graph above this seems to be a reasonable counterfactual.  
Now that there is data on IMF compliance it is possible to distinguish which of 
these arguments holds water. There is also significant variation in compliance between 
countries; Figure 2 looks normally distributed. This allows for a test of how compliance 
affects labor rights. If countries are not implementing reforms, then none of the 
mechanisms outlined in the literature should operate. Instead declines in human rights 
may be caused by some other factor. Compliance as a causal mechanism is thus critical to 
almost any theory tying IMF conditionality to a decline in labor rights (as well as other 
socio-economic conditions).  
Compliance with IMF Austerity and Labor Rights 
 IMF austerity negatively impacts labor rights through more than one mechanism. 
All of these mechanisms rely on compliance with conditionality in order for them to 
operate. Given that compliance with IMF austerity reforms in the 21st century is under 
40% there is reason to be skeptical about whether the findings of past work still hold. It is 
well worth exploring how compliance fits into some of these arguments, and testing 
whether these arguments still hold even when compliance is low.  
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The most common argument tying IMF austerity to a decline in labor rights 
centers around labor reforms included in conditionality. In the Greek example at the 
beginning of this paper labor reforms (cuts to pensions, minimum wage freezes, 
dismantling collective bargaining agreements) were a large part of protester opposition to 
austerity. IMF labor reforms are centered around making labor more flexible and 
responsive to changing market conditions. Labor laws and regulations meant to protect 
workers are costly. For this reason, labor rights have often been compared to protectionist 
policies and seen as an impediment to development.78 When market conditions change 
these regulations make it harder for businesses to adapt and stay competitive. Labor 
market flexibility attempts to mitigate these costs by making it easier for businesses to 
adjust their supply and cost of labor. In practice this means making it easier to fire 
workers and alter the terms of their employment. Wage freezes, layoffs of public 
employees, and cuts to benefits and worker pensions are commonly contained in IMF 
austerity.79 It is not surprising that the promotion of labor market flexibility has been 
shown to reduces wages, job security, benefits, and the ability to unionize.80 This is the 
goal of labor flexibility reforms. This undermines the ability of union organizers to 
protect workers who try to unionize or bargain collectively.81 It also makes it harder for 
workers to overcome collective action problems.82 Taken together these reforms 
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undermine collective labor rights by weakening existing unions and increasing barriers to 
collective action by workers.  
Budget requirements associated with IMF austerity present a second mechanism. 
IMF borrowers are required to significantly cut government spending. Cuts to social 
welfare spending (i.e. unemployment insurance, food subsidies, and public housing) 
increase the hardship that workers face during an economic crisis. Those who are out of 
work have less time to find a new job. High unemployment coupled with a weak safety 
net creates competition among workers making it harder for unions to organize and 
bargain collectively. Workers may give up a union drive that sees them going without 
wages in favor of a job that pays. The extent of this cut is significant; past research has 
shown that democracies under IMF lending tend to decrease spending on social welfare 
to the level seen in autocracies.83 Cuts to labor monitoring agencies make it less likely 
that these agencies have the resources to hold firms which violate labor rights 
accountable. This decreases the cost of violating labor rights for firms. Given firms are 
often facing financial trouble themselves this increases the benefit of labor rights 
violations which may help firms stay in business by lowering production costs. This is 
especially true for multi-national firms which commit significant resources to prevent 
being targeted by regulatory agencies and to fighting labor rights enforcement.84 Budget 
requirements therefore negatively impact labor rights both by shrinking the social safety 
net and by increasing the likelihood that firms violate labor rights.  
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 IMF induced privatization of state owned enterprises can also put downward 
pressure on labor rights.85 Privatization tends to disproportionately affect women and 
minorities who benefit from public employment and have a more difficult time finding 
employment under equal conditions in the private sector. These groups face a higher rate 
of labor violations in the private sector, and these violations are more difficult to 
monitor.86 This is doubly true if spending cuts affect monitoring agencies in the way 
outlined above. Free trade policies provide another mechanism. IMF austerity often asks 
countries to create export processing zones (EPZs) which are exempt from domestic labor 
laws. Predictably labor rights violations are larger in EPZs that in non-EPZs.87 Opening 
up trade while simultaneously cutting social welfare spending, reducing the resources 
used to monitor/punish labor violations, and decreasing domestic protections of workers 
results in greater violations of labor rights.88  
One important point of note is that these policies by themselves may not have a 
negative impact on labor rights.89 Opening up trade while expanding social welfare 
protections may lead to growth while simultaneously compensating/insuring those who 
lose out.90 Leaders have wiggle room where they can alter other policies to offset 
                                                      
85 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Blanton et al. 2015; See Detraz and Peksen 2016 
86 Detraz and Peksen 2016 
87 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007 
88 Mosley 2000; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Rudra 2008 
89 See for example Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009 
90 Adsera and Boix 2002 
42 
 
negative costs for the losers of reform.91 When multiple policies are enacted 
simultaneously on the other hand there is much less wiggle room. Austerity as a policy 
package undermines labor rights respect when these policies are implemented together.92 
The reverse side of this argument implies non-implementation of large parts of IMF 
austerity may give leaders wiggle room to offset some of the negative costs for workers. 
Leaders could use IMF funds to buy support by investing in unemployment and low 
compliance may mean that leaders get the benefits of IMF support without paying the 
costs. 93  
Compliance must be sufficiently high for interdependent austerity policies to have 
a negative effect on labor rights. Low compliance on the other hand gives leaders room to 
prevent labor rights violations if they want to. If IMF borrowers have historically 
implemented very few austerity policies then declines in labor rights may not be the fault 
of austerity. Instead non-compliance with reforms may give cover to leaders who 
intended to dismantle labor rights anyway but wanted a scapegoat.94 The IMF may not 
alter state behavior from what it would have been.95 Especially since the IMF continues 
to lend to those who need loans even if they do not comply with conditionality.96 The 
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IMF as an International Organization may simply be inefficient.97 Without directly 
testing how compliance affects labor rights it is difficult to distinguish whether IMF 
reforms are causing labor rights violations.  
A final argument suggests that simply participating in an IMF program is enough 
to undermine labor rights. Participation in an IMF program has been argued to signal a 
commitment to pro-market reforms and this signal is more credible with more stringent 
austerity. 98, 99 This allows leaders to overcome commitment problems since these 
reforms are costly, unpopular, and leaders have incentive to renege on them later.100 IMF 
program participation “sends a clear signal to domestic groups, as well as the 
international marketplace, that the recipient government is reforming its economy along 
the lines of the ‘Washington Consensus,’” and points to an eroding collective bargaining 
regime.101 However, if there is low compliance with IMF conditionality then is this really 
a credible signal? Negotiating and agreeing to an international agreement and then 
breaking the terms of that agreement should make market actors question the sincerity of 
commitment to reform.102  
Information about compliance is easily accessible in the 21st century. Letters of 
intent and country program evaluations (updated throughout the course of an IMF 
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program) are published on the IMF website and program evaluations are discussed in the 
news. Given the importance market actors attach to timely information it seems unlikely 
that signing up for an IMF program and not implementing reforms would send a credible 
signal. More likely non-compliance causes market actors to punish leaders who renege on 
their commitments. This may explain why foreign investment which should be attracted 
to IMF borrowers tends to decline under program lending.103 If low compliance is 
common and this information is easily accessible then the negative relationship between 
IMF austerity and FDI makes sense. Simply being under an IMF program is not enough 
to credibly signal a commitment to market friendly policies. High compliance therefore 
can have a negative impact on labor rights both as a result of policy reform but also 
indirectly as a function of the signals that it conveys to market actors. The consequences 
of policy reform versus signaling are observationally equivalent and both require that the 
government implements IMF austerity. This discussion implies a single hypothesis: 
H1: As compliance with IMF austerity increases 
government respect for collective labor rights decreases 
 
 In addition to low-compliance, in most IMF programs there are two additional 
reasons to be skeptical that IMF lending undermines labor rights in the 21st century. First, 
the IMF has increasingly worked with the ILO, the International Trade Union 
Confederation and civil society groups (such as domestic unions) to minimize the 
negative impact of conditionality. 104 Reforms to IMF lending in the 21st century have 
attempted to address criticisms such as those levied above. The IMF has consulted with 
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these organizations in order to minimize the labor consequences of austerity. Publicly the 
IMF has discussed the tradeoff between competitiveness and labor rights, designing 
conditionality to ensure the costs of reform are not borne too heavily by labor.105  
Second, although the IMF does not incorporate the language of human rights into 
its lending agreements it is publicly committed to poverty alleviation and social welfare 
spending floors. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund (PRGF) as well as the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) designs IMF austerity to meet the challenges of 
low-income countries. Of particular note is the addition of conditions aimed at alleviating 
poverty.106 Similarly, in 2009 the IMF began participating in the One UN Social 
Protection Floor initiative developed by the ILO.107 Under this initiative the IMF has 
added social spending floors and encouraged social spending considered “macro-critical.” 
108 These reforms suggest that the conditions which undermined labor rights in the past 
may have been ameliorated by reforms to IMF lending in the 21st century. Even if past 
IMF programs undermined labor rights in the 21st century IMF austerity may not. Despite 
these reforms many scholars remain skeptical, arguing that this is simply rhetoric and 
program lending today is much the same as it was in the past.109 In order to determine 
whether it is IMF austerity or other factors the next section outlines an empirical research 
design that directly tests the effect of compliance on collective labor rights.  
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Research Design 
This paper uses a sample of IMF borrowers in the 21st century to explore how 
compliance with IMF austerity impacts labor rights. The sample consists of 74 countries 
between the period 2002-2014 which were under IMF lending. The dataset consists of 
panel data measured at the country-year level. Considering only IMF borrowers has 
several advantages. First, it alleviates the need for a structural equation model as IMF 
borrowers encompass a non-random set of countries.110  
Second, this sample creates a very useful counterfactual for the argument made 
above. Empirical results will tell us how more compliance affects labor rights compared 
to less compliance. Therefore, IMF austerity reforms are what vary rather than any other 
factor which might explain differences in outcomes and who signs up for an IMF 
program.  
Finally, this is a direct test of debates in the literature over what would have 
happened had a country implemented IMF reforms. The limitation of this approach is that 
it tells us nothing about whether IMF borrowers have worse labor rights than non-IMF 
borrowers facing economic trouble. Given the nature of the compliance data (which is 
missing for non-IMF borrowers) this modelling choice allows for a direct and 
straightforward test of the hypothesis.  
 This paper uses a partial proportional odds model developed by Peterson and 
Harrell (1990) and operationalized using the gologit2 program in Stata 15. This model is 
appropriate for ordinal dependent variables where one or more of the predictor variables 
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may have violated the proportional odds assumption. The proportional odds assumption 
for ordered models assumes that the effect of a predictor is the same across all values of 
the ordinal variable. In practice this assumption is often violated. This model tests 
whether any of the predictors violate this assumption and if they do it calculates k-1 
coefficients. If this assumption is not violated then the model is the same as an ordered 
logit model. All predictor variables are lagged one year to ensure the proper order of 
causality.  
Dependent Variable 
 This paper uses two dependent variables to measure collective labor rights: 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. Both variables are taken from the 
forthcoming WORKER rights dataset developed by Barry, Clay, and Cingranelli. Using 
US State Department Reports on Human Rights the dataset codes government respect for 
labor rights in practice and in law. Coding for these rights is based on ILO standards. 
Freedom of association represents the right of workers to establish and join organizations 
of their choice without interference from employers. In practice this is the right to 
unionize without discrimination. Collective bargaining represents the right of workers to 
be represented in negotiations over labor disputes. In practice this represents the right of 
unions to bargain collectively and for workers to strike. Each of these indicators is 
ordinal and coded: 0 (mass violations), 1 (some violations), or 2 (no violations). The use 
of two dependent variables has the advantage of allowing IMF compliance to negatively 
impact one of these rights while having a different effect on another. This is therefore a 
more nuanced test of the theory outlined above.  
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Independent Variable 
 The main independent variable included in this analysis is IMF compliance. This 
variable measures the percentage of IMF conditions met in a country year which ranges 
from 0 to 100. It is coded as the number of conditions which the IMF executive board 
determined were met divided by the total number of conditions evaluated in a year. This 
variable is taken from the SCIP dataset developed by the author and is an original 
compliance measure. This is the most direct measure of IMF compliance as it provides a 
single number to explain whether or not borrowers have implemented reforms. It does not 
on its own distinguish between how many conditions a country was tasked with 
implementing (severity), how difficult those conditions were (depth), or how many policy 
areas those conditions covered (scope). Although these are shortcomings, this measure is 
a major improvement over past empirical work which has assumed compliance away or 
used a dichotomous measure indicating a country had complied or not. The distribution 
of this variable can be seen in Figure 2 above.  
 The empirical analysis includes a number of control variables that the literature 
has found to be important determinants of labor rights and might reasonably be 
associated with IMF program compliance. Higher levels of democracy should correspond 
to better respect for labor rights.111 More democratic countries have greater constraints on 
leader behavior and a larger set of institutions through which workers might demand 
better labor protections. Regime type has also been theorized as an important determinant 
of whether countries comply with international agreements.112 The models in the paper 
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include the polity2 measure of democracy taken from the Polity IV project. This measure 
ranges from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more democratic state and a more 
constrained leader.  
 Unemployment weakens the power of labor relative to capital113 and may affect 
the government’s decision to implement reforms. A measure of unemployment as a 
percentage of the total labor force in included. This measure is taken from the World 
Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) dataset. Labor protests represent the strength 
and organization of laborers in a country. Protest may limit the implementation of IMF 
conditions114 and affect government decisions to protect labor rights. A measure of the 
yearly number of labor protests is included. This measure is taken from the Mass 
Mobilization dataset.115  
 The ideological position of the government should have a large impact on both 
compliance with IMF reforms and protection of labor rights.116 Leftist governments have 
traditionally been pro-labor and should therefore protect labor rights. I include a 
dichotomous measure of whether the leader of a country is considered to the left on an 
ideological scale. This measure is taken from the Database of Political Institutions. 
Governments that repress citizens may also be more willing to implement economic 
reforms which harm citizens.117 I include the Physical Integrity Rights index taken from 
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the CIRI human rights dataset. This variable is coded from 0 to 8 with higher values 
indicating a less repressive government.  
In countries where there is a larger population it may be harder to organize unions 
or strikes while at the same time it may be more difficult to implement large scale 
reforms. I include the logged population size of a country. State capacity and wealth 
should affect the ability of the state to implement reforms which might lead workers to 
act collectively. Wealth has also been used as a proxy for economic grievances. I include 
the logged value of GDP per capita as a measure of state capacity and other grievances in 
society.118 IMF reforms should generate the largest benefits for countries which rely on 
foreign investment and trade. Both foreign investment and trade impact labor rights 
protections with researchers being split on whether this effect is positive or negative.119 
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP and trade as a percentage of GDP are 
both logged and included as control variables. All of these variables are also taken from 
the World Bank WDI.  
The willingness to implement reforms and the likelihood that a government does 
so without compensating workers should be conditional on need for IMF financing. 
Another option is for leaders to end IMF agreements prematurely rather than continue 
dismantling labor protections. Controlling for the probability of exit alleviates issues of 
non-random sample selection as the decision to exit an IMF program is based on similar 
factors as the decision to enter one.120  
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120 Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 
51 
 
To control for this, I design a logistic regression model predicting early exit from 
IMF lending. The decision to end an IMF program early is a function of: economic 
conditions, the willingness of the IMF to lend, and political considerations. The 
dependent variable is coded as 1 if an IMF program ended earlier than it was scheduled 
(both in the original agreement and in revisions of that agreement) and 0 if it did not end 
early in a given year. Early exit is a function of economic health (current account 
balance, inflation, GDP growth, and overall wealth), political considerations (regime 
type), and the willingness of the IMF to continue lending (the number of IMF borrowers, 
US economic aid), as well as yearly fixed effects which capture variation in IMF funding 
and external shocks (such as the global recession). The predicted values of this equation 
are then included as a control variable to capture both selection into an IMF program and 
the probability that a country ends an IMF program early. This equation and a discussion 
of the model specification can be found in the appendix.       
Results 
Table 1 contains the results from two partial proportional odds models.  None of 
the regressors included in either Model 1 or Model 2 violate the parallel line assumption. 
This model therefore simplifies to the ordered logit model. Turning first to the control 
variables it appears that countries which had better collective labor rights in the preceding 
year also have better labor rights in the current year which was expected. Countries with 
better physical integrity rights (in Model 2 only) and those with more labor protests (in 
both models) tend to have better collective labor practices. Somewhat oddly, leftist 
governments tend to have worse respect for collective labor practices, though this may 
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make sense if these governments are trying to credibly signal a willingness to promote 
market reforms.121  
 Both models show that as compliance with IMF reforms increases government 
respect for collective labor rights decreases. In Model 1 as IMF compliance increases, 
respect for freedom of association declines. These results are statistically significant at 
the 95% level with a two-tail test. In Model 2, collective bargaining rights decline as IMF 
compliance increases. These results are statistically significant at the 90% level. This is 
encouraging given the tendency of MLE models with small samples to downwardly bias 
coefficients.122 The small sample size used here is a more stringent test of Hypothesis 1. 
The results from this table provide support for Hypothesis 1.   
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These models can be difficult to interpret. Using the margins commands in Stata 
15, the two plots below show the probability that freedom of association (Figure 3) and 
collective bargaining (Figure 4) will take on the values 0, 1, or 2. The in-sample 
probabilities use the actual values of all of the control variables but vary the value of IMF 
Table 1.  Proportional Odds Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Freedom of Association Collective Bargaining 
   
IMF compliance -0.016*** -0.015* 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
GDP growth  -0.020 0.064* 
 (0.041) (0.035) 
Democracy 0.017 0.021 
 (0.026) (0.031) 
Population (logged) -0.141 0.204 
 (0.122) (0.135) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.077 0.066 
 (0.119) (0.140) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.021 -0.019 
 (0.081) (0.125) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.119 0.457 
 (0.364) (0.479) 
Labor protests 0.185** 0.159*** 
 (0.089) (0.059) 
Unemployment 0.013 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.019) 
Leftist government -0.521* -0.748** 
 (0.299) (0.322) 
Physical integrity rights 0.157 0.395*** 
 (0.099) (0.113) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.319 -2.385 
 (1.976) (2.185) 
Lagged DV 2.928*** 3.559*** 
 (0.285) (0.344) 
Constant 1 0.064 -8.420** 
 (3.260) (4.001) 
Constant 2 -4.490 -13.699*** 
 (3.273) (3.958) 
   
Observations 404 404 
Number of countries 74 74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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compliance over its full range. The resulting predictions show how varying levels of 
compliance affect the probability that a country respects labor rights. These probabilities 
add up to 1, so as the probability of one value decreases the probability of another value 
must increase. This plot is useful for discussing these results and showing them visually 
as it provides much more information than the table.  
Figure 3 plots the predicted effects of IMF compliance on freedom of association. 
The x-axis represents the percent of IMF conditions evaluated which were implemented. 
The y-axis represents the probability of seeing any particular outcome. Mass violations 
correspond to a score of 0, some violation to a score of 1, and no violations to a score of 
2. In Figure 3 the probability of seeing no violations declines 12%; from about 23% with 
0% compliance down to around 11% with 100% compliance. As countries implement 
more conditions they are less likely to have high respect for freedom of association. The 
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probability of seeing some violations declines slightly from about 58% down to 52% 
though the confidence intervals overlap at all points across the x-axis. For mass violations 
there is a pronounced increase of about 20% as IMF compliance increases from 0 to 
100%. When countries implement more IMF conditions they are more likely to score a 0 
on freedom of association. Although it is hard to tell, the decline in 1 and 2 values at 
higher values of implementation suggest that countries are moving from full respect to 
some respect at a lower rate than they are moving from some respect to no respect.    
Figure 4 shows the predicted effect of IMF compliance on collective bargaining. 
The labels correspond to the same values as those in Figure 3. We see a somewhat similar 
picture. The probability of seeing no collective bargaining violations declines from 
around 11% to 5% over the range of compliance. The confidence bands around these 
predictions are quite tight though they overlap over the range of compliance values. The 
probability of seeing some violations declines more steeply than in Figure 3. When a 
country implements 0% of conditions the probability of seeing some violations is 55%. 
This value drops to 46% when countries implement 100% of policies. The probability of 
mass violations once again significantly increases from 33% with no compliance to 49% 
with full compliance. This graph tells much the same story as the one above. Countries 
are moving from full respect to some respect as a slower rate than they are moving from 
some respect to no respect for collective bargaining rights.     
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 Overall these findings present support for Hypothesis 1. IMF compliance has a 
statistically significant effect on both freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
This suggests that countries which implement IMF reforms in the 21st century tend to 
violate collective labor rights at higher levels than they would have had they 
implemented fewer IMF conditions. 
Robustness Checks 
A series of robustness checks can be found in Appendix A. One such check is 
reported below. Mokkan scaling analysis suggests that freedom of association and 
collective bargaining can be combined into a single scale.123 The collective labor rights 
scale ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values indicating better respect for labor rights. Past 
work has tended to look at a single measure of labor rights and the findings above as well 
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as the Mokkan scaling analysis suggests that this approach is still appropriate for 
collective labor rights from this dataset.  
I re-estimate the model above using ordinary least squares with panel corrected 
standard errors. This model is appropriate when the number of countries in a sample (74 
in this case) is much larger than the number of time periods (13 years). The model 
assumes heteroskedasticity in the panels. Once again, all variables are lagged one year to 
minimize the possibility of simultaneity. Fixed effects are added to evaluate whether this 
relationship holds within countries over time.  
The main findings of this model are the same as the partial proportional odds 
model above with some differences among the control variables. Countries which had 
better labor rights in the previous year, experienced growth, which are poorer, have labor 
protests, low unemployment, and do not have a leftist leader tend to see better 
government respect for collective labor rights in practice. Although fixed effects were 
added the control variables in this model perform better than in models 1 and 2 likely 
because OLS models are better suited to handling small sample sizes than maximum 
likelihood. The R-square of 0.76 suggests that this model explains a lot of the variance in 
collective labor rights.  
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Table 2.  OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
 Model 3 
 Collective labor rights 
  
IMF compliance -0.005*** 
 (0.002) 
GDP growth  0.019* 
 (0.010) 
Democracy -0.038 
 (0.032) 
Population (logged) -0.306 
 (0.721) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.370** 
 (0.152) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.066 
 (0.053) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.213 
 (0.269) 
Labor protests 0.027** 
 (0.013) 
Unemployment, -0.065*** 
 (0.020) 
Leftist government -0.299** 
 (0.139) 
Physical integrity rights 0.059 
 (0.040) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.444 
 (0.573) 
Lagged DV 0.295*** 
 (0.064) 
Constant 7.036 
 (11.041) 
  
Observations 404 
Number of countries 74 
R-squared 0.762 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Once again as IMF compliance increases collective labor practices decrease. 
Figure 5 below plots the in-sample predictions from Model 3, once again using the 
margins command in Stata 15. This figure includes 95% confidence intervals around 
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these predictions. These predictions are much more straightforward than the partial 
proportional odds graphs, but show the same relationship. Moving from 0% compliance 
to 100% compliance decreases respect for collective labor rights by about 0.5.  
 
  As compliance moves from 0% of conditions to 100% of conditions labor 
practices decline by about 0.5. Most countries show little to no change in collective labor 
practices from one year to the next. So a decrease of 0.5 is quite large. The average 
country implements around 40% of IMF conditions and if they stay under IMF program 
lending for 5 years (about 25% of the sample) then labor rights decline by 1 unit. This is 
quite large given that labor rights rarely change from year to year and the scale only takes 
on five values. The confidence intervals around these predictions are quite tight around 
the middle though wider at the extremes. These results once again provide support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
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 Beyond the OLS model presented above, Appendix A contains a number of 
additional robustness checks including: a bivariate ordered probit model predicting laws 
and practices as conditionally related equations; predictions for freedom of association 
and collective bargaining as jointly related in a bivariate ordered probit model; random 
effects; additional IMF controls such as the type of loan, the time under IMF lending, and 
the size of the loan; non-IMF controls such as the electoral system, the time a leader has 
been in office, US economic aid, level of economic liberalization, labor abundance of the 
country, and migrant remittances; and a non-OECD sample. The results remain robust to 
all of these model specifications.  
Conclusion   
 This paper has shown that compliance with IMF conditionality undermines 
respect for collective bargaining rights. When governments implement austerity reforms 
it leads to more violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining. Labor 
rights have been declining for decades and the findings here suggest that the IMF has 
been a major contributor to this decline. Austerity policies themselves are designed to 
weaken labor and the implementation of these policies has been shown to do exactly that.  
 The literature tying IMF lending to a decline in labor rights and the welfare of 
workers is large. Scholars have long associated IMF lending with declines in wages, 
working conditions, equal pay, anti-union discrimination, and violence against labor 
organizers. These findings have often been treated with skepticism given that compliance 
with reforms is low. The findings here provide support for this literature as well as the 
wider literature tying IMF lending to negative human rights in general. When 
governments follow through on their commitments to the IMF citizens suffer. While 
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adverse selection and political interference may indeed undermine the success of IMF 
lending, the policies themselves are incompatible with the protection of labor rights. 
Despite efforts to work with the ILO and labor unions, austerity policies themselves will 
continue to undermine labor rights unless protections for these rights are incorporated 
into lending agreements. If the IMF is truly concerned with protecting workers then these 
rights should be built into agreements and the disbursement of loans should be 
conditional on the protection of these rights.  
International organizations can have a large impact on domestic politics and the 
way governments treat their citizens. When these organizations do not evaluate the 
human rights consequences of their actions and do not build human rights protections 
into their agreements we are likely to see human rights violations. The IMF is not the 
only International Organizations that is guilty of this and as the number of International 
Organizations increase the potential for harm increases as well. 
 Despite the findings here there remain a large number of questions. Do these 
results hold for other types of labor rights? Are certain IMF conditions more harmful than 
others? Do some IMF conditions improve labor rights such as efforts to collect data and 
strengthen the legal system? Do non-IMF borrowers under austerity see the same rate of 
labor rights violations? How do labor rights fare in the years after IMF lending has ended 
and is there evidence of a J-curve?  
 Austerity has been the dominant policy package for economic reform since the 
1980s. Building on neoliberal economic theory governments have been pressured into 
slashing their budgets, their safety nets, de-regulating labor markets, privatizing state-
owned enterprises, and promoting free trade. Despite these reforms most developing 
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countries have not seen faster economic recovery or greater development. Instead 
inequality and declines in economic rights have followed as governments have proved 
unable or unwilling to compensate the losers of these reforms. The evidence here ties 
austerity directly to declines in labor rights. Given the failures of austerity to address the 
global crisis in 2007, and the empirical evidence provided here it is becoming 
increasingly evident that austerity and human rights protections are not compatible. 
Where human rights decline we are more likely to see conflict, political instability, 
corruption, and economic crisis. Austerity has not generated the benefits it was theorized 
to and tweaking the reforms is unlikely to solve this problem. Instead human rights led 
development should be adopted as a means to promote peace and economic development 
especially in International Organizations associated with the United Nations like the IMF.  
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Appendix A - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings 
in chapter 1. This is meant to test how sensitive the negative relationship between IMF 
compliance and labor rights is, and see if this relationship disappears when using 
alternative model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail 
test. 
 
These robustness checks are summarized here: 
• 1a. Logistic regression of IMF exit probability 
• 2a. Collective labor rights pre-2008 and 2008-2014 
• 3a. Freedom of association and collective bargaining pre-2008 and 2008-2014 
• 4a. Bivariate ordered probit for collective labor laws and practices 
• 5a. Bivariate ordered probit for freedom of association and collective bargaining  
• 6a. IMF control variables for collective practices 
• 7a. IMF control variables for freedom of association and collective bargaining 
• 8a. Non-IMF controls for collective practices 
• 9a. Non-IMF controls for freedom of association and collective practices 
• 10a. Bootstrapped standard errors for an ordered probit model 
• 11a. Non-OECD sample  
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Appendix table 1a models IMF exit probability. This model predicts whether a country 
leaves an IMF program earlier than was agreed upon. Predictions from this model are 
used in chapter 1 as a control variable. Countries under IMF lending in the previous year, 
those who trade a lot, and a low number of IMF borrowers globally all increase the 
probability of early exit.  
 
Appendix table 1a. Logistic regression Model 1a 
 IMF exit 
  
IMF participation (T-1) 1.723** 
 (0.767) 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.006 
 (0.050) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.013 
 (0.023) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0.019 
 (0.028) 
Population (logged) 0.322* 
 (0.181) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.252 
 (0.193) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.121 
 (0.181) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 1.195** 
 (0.555) 
US economic aid 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Democracy 0.089 
 (0.054) 
Number of IMF borrowers -0.284*** 
 (0.098) 
Constant -5.246 
 (5.698) 
Year fixed effects YES 
Observations 462 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 2a uses the collective practices variable from the robustness section of 
chapter 1. This model is split into the pre-2008 and 2008 forward periods. This is to 
control for changes to IMF funding and reforms which occurred in response to the global 
financial crisis. The results here remain unchanged even with this smaller sample. 
Appendix table 2a. OLS with PCSE and fixed effects. Model 2a Model 3a 
Collective practices 2008-2014 2002-2007 
   
Lagged DV 0.053 0.245* 
 (0.080) (0.145) 
IMF compliance -0.005* -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
GDP growth 0.019 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.012) 
Democracy -0.035 -0.100*** 
 (0.044) (0.028) 
Total Population logged -1.818 -4.354*** 
 (1.644) (1.316) 
GDP per capita logged -0.093 0.323* 
 (0.521) (0.194) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.090 -0.082 
 (0.083) (0.072) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.068 1.415*** 
 (0.448) (0.444) 
Labor protest 0.043** -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.057) 
Unemployment -0.031 0.077** 
 (0.027) (0.033) 
Leftist government -0.675*** 0.021 
 (0.257) (0.096) 
Physical integrity rights index 0.098* -0.046 
 (0.058) (0.044) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.691 -0.625 
 (0.772) (0.593) 
Constant 29.773 62.762*** 
 (24.299) (20.528) 
   
Observations 232 172 
R-squared 0.760 0.913 
Number of countries 62 53 
73 
 
Fixed effects YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix table 3a uses the same model specification as appendix table 2a but uses 
freedom of association and collective bargaining broken down by time period. Results 
which violate the parallel line assumption have a second coefficient estimated in the 
Gamma2 equation. The results here once again support those in chapter 1. The one 
exception is model 6 in which IMF compliance is not significant. This is likely due to the 
small sample size (242 cases) and use of an MLE model. Model 7 also seems to blow up 
in the gamma2 equation suggesting that this model is poorly specified. Once again this 
makes sense given the small sample size (172 cases) and use of an MLE model. This 
does provide some evidence that the model fits better for freedom of association than it 
does for collective bargaining.   
Appendix table 3a.  
Partial proportional  
odds model 
Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a 
Freedom of 
association 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
Collective 
bargaining 
2008-2014 2002-2007 2008-2014 2002-2007 
Equation      
Beta Lagged DV 1.896*** 5.555*** 2.405*** 8.328*** 
  (0.298) (0.729) (0.312) (2.314) 
 IMF compliance -0.019*** -0.038*** -0.010 -0.050** 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024) 
 Democracy 0.043 0.020 0.074* 0.020 
  (0.034) (0.066) (0.039) (0.113) 
 Population 
(logged) 
-0.232 -0.110 -0.077 0.613 
 (0.163) (0.256) (0.184) (0.595) 
 GDP per capita 
logged 
0.032 0.590** -0.311* 0.998 
 (0.147) (0.252) (0.166) (0.609) 
 FDI (% of GDP 
logged) 
0.060 0.089 0.394** -0.358 
 (0.141) (0.161) (0.167) (0.343) 
 Trade (% of GDP 
logged) 
0.141 -0.741 -0.310 0.273 
 (0.478) (0.776) (0.648) (1.241) 
 Labor protest 0.222** -0.273 0.158** -0.418 
  (0.095) (0.297) (0.066) (0.664) 
 Unemployment 0.009 -0.026 -0.010 0.133* 
  (0.018) (0.065) (0.022) (0.080) 
 Leftist -0.823** -0.276 -1.400*** -1.321 
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government 
  (0.365) (0.799) (0.431) (1.187) 
 Physical integrity 
rights index 
0.143 0.260 0.306** 0.586* 
 (0.120) (0.185) (0.144) (0.341) 
 Probability of 
IMF exit 
1.249 2.016 1.584 -6.706 
 (2.565) (3.626) (3.124) (6.268) 
 Constant 2.292 -1.427 2.081 -23.665 
  (4.334) (6.682) (5.081) (16.920) 
Gamma2  IMF compliance    -20.799*** 
     (0.872) 
 Democracy    -93.862*** 
     (3.942) 
 Total Population 
logged 
  1.374*** -179.106*** 
   (0.336) (7.448) 
 GDP per capita 
logged 
  0.599*** -430.385*** 
   (0.210) (18.063) 
 FDI (% of GDP 
logged) 
  -0.815** -487.804*** 
   (0.359) (20.483) 
 Trade (% of GDP 
logged) 
  3.300*** -844.363*** 
   (1.201) (35.457) 
 Labor protest    -65.182*** 
     (2.754) 
 Unemployment   -0.209*** -92.317*** 
    (0.052) (3.921) 
 Leftist 
government 
  1.375** 703.077*** 
    (0.602) (29.820) 
 Physical integrity 
rights index 
  1.383*** 516.376*** 
   (0.329) (21.652) 
 Probability of 
IMF exit 
  -10.595*** 7,345.601*** 
   (3.095) (307.517) 
 Lagged DV    1,488.383*** 
     (61.401) 
 Constant 2 -1.624 -8.222 -50.026*** 5,471.225*** 
  (4.293) (6.705) (10.378) (230.046) 
      
 Observations 232 172 232 172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 4a models labor practices and labor laws a jointly related. This model 
sees decisions to violate/improve laws and practices as jointly related. Leaders may 
dismantle institutional protections of workers (labor laws) or they may reduce the ability 
of governments to enforce laws. Alternatively, firms may choose to violate practices 
rather than push for changes to laws. I choose to model laws as a function of practices 
rather than the reverse though the results remain unchanged. Labor laws is a mokkan 
scale composed of freedom of association laws plus collective bargaining laws. It is 
constructed in the same manner as collective labor practices. IMF compliance has a 
negative effect on labor practices consistent with findings in the paper. IMF compliance 
however does not negatively impact labor laws. Rho in this model is insignificant 
suggesting that laws and practices can be separated independently.  
 
 Model 8a 
Appendix table 4a. 
Bivariate ordered 
probit.  
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Labor practices Labor laws 
   
Labor laws  1.807*** 
  (0.196) 
Labor practices 1.170*** 0.323*** 
 (0.116) (0.087) 
IMF compliance -0.008*** -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
GDP per capita 
growth 
0.010 0.027 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
Democracy 0.004 0.036** 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
Population (logged) -0.004 -0.106 
 (0.060) (0.087) 
GDP per capita 
(logged) 
0.043 -0.034 
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 (0.062) (0.066) 
FDI (% of GDP 
logged) 
0.004 -0.047 
 (0.044) (0.057) 
Trade (% of GDP 
logged) 
0.112 -0.081 
 (0.199) (0.251) 
Labor protest 0.108*** 0.019 
 (0.032) (0.020) 
Unemployment 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
Leftist government -0.312** -0.045 
 (0.141) (0.186) 
Physical integrity 
rights 
0.131*** 0.022 
 (0.049) (0.058) 
Probability of IMF 
exit 
-0.488 -1.223 
 (0.990) (1.004) 
Cut 1 1.592 -1.698 
 (1.664) (2.306) 
Cut 2 2.438 -0.033 
 (1.683) (2.254) 
Cut 3 4.516*** 2.996 
 (1.702) (2.253) 
Cut 4 5.869*** 4.951** 
 (1.697) (2.237) 
Observations 404 404 
Rho  0.15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 5a sees decisions to violate freedom of association and collective 
bargaining as interrelated. Firms for example may choose to discriminate against union 
workers and punish workers for striking. Governments decisions to enforce collective 
bargaining practices may depend on whether freedom of association has led to the 
creation of strong unions who might opposed such moves. Rho in this model is quite 
large 0.56*** and significant suggesting that freedom of association practices and 
collective bargaining practices are interrelated.  
 
Appendix table 5a. 
Bivariate ordered probit 
Model 9a 
Collective bargaining Freedom of association 
   
IMF compliance -0.008** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.041** -0.012 
 (0.020) (0.018) 
Democracy 0.012 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.018) 
Total Population (logged) 0.094 -0.091 
 (0.085) (0.080) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.024 0.042 
 (0.078) (0.076) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.037 0.015 
 (0.067) (0.063) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.275 0.076 
 (0.240) (0.223) 
Labor protest 0.088** 0.103** 
 (0.042) (0.047) 
Unemployment -0.006 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Leftist government -0.394** -0.289* 
 (0.171) (0.158) 
Physical integrity rights 0.236*** 0.096* 
 (0.061) (0.055) 
Probability of IMF exit -1.342 0.293 
 (1.169) (1.072) 
Lagged DV 1.873*** 1.577*** 
 (0.147) (0.131) 
Cut 1 4.340** -0.253 
 (2.166) (2.031) 
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Cut 2 7.270*** 2.324 
 (2.190) (2.029) 
Observations 404 404 
Rho  0.56*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 6a models collective labor practices as both an ordered probit model (due 
to convergence issues with the partial proportional odds model) and as an OLS model 
with fixed effects. A battery of IMF control variables from the SCIP dataset are included 
such as the time under IMF lending, the size of the IMF loan, and the specific type of 
loan. The results are unchanged from chapter 1. Higher levels of compliance lead to an 
increase in violations of collective labor practices. 
 
Appendix table 6a. Model 10a Model 11a 
IMF controls Ordered probit OLS with 
PCSE 
   
Lagged DV 1.157*** 0.281*** 
 (0.119) (0.066) 
IMF compliance -0.009*** -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Time under IMF lending 0.006 0.036 
 (0.020) (0.024) 
IMF loan size 0.017 -0.056 
 (0.045) (0.044) 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan 0.221 0.191 
 (0.317) (0.349) 
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan 0.236 -0.279 
 (0.180) (0.319) 
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan -0.346 -0.537 
 (0.332) (0.419) 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan 0.146 0.172 
 (0.193) (0.165) 
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan 0.027 -0.068 
 (0.294) (0.242) 
Standby Arrangement (SBA) -0.041 -0.020 
 (0.234) (0.323) 
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan -0.647 -0.448 
 (0.522) (0.464) 
Democracy 0.007 -0.041 
 (0.013) (0.031) 
Population (logged) 0.002 -0.355 
 (0.063) (0.848) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.056 -0.387** 
 (0.092) (0.187) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.010 -0.073 
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 (0.044) (0.055) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.132 0.289 
 (0.196) (0.297) 
Labor protest 0.107*** 0.031** 
 (0.031) (0.013) 
Unemployment 0.002 -0.066*** 
 (0.009) (0.019) 
Leftist government -0.324** -0.349** 
 (0.135) (0.144) 
Physical integrity rights 0.122** 0.038 
 (0.052) (0.039) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.564 0.286 
 (0.992) (0.579) 
Cut 1 1.891 - 
 (1.709)  
Cut 2 2.744 - 
 (1.723)  
Cut 3 4.824*** - 
 (1.760)  
Cut 4 6.188*** - 
 (1.763)  
Constant - 7.830 
  (13.440) 
   
Observations 404 404 
R-squared 0.37 0.765 
Number of countries 74 74 
Fixed effects NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The reference category for the type of IMF loan is Extended Credit Facilities (ECF) 
 This value corresponds to a pseudo R2 
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Appendix table 7a is the same model specification from table 6a using freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. The main finding remains the same. A number of 
the IMF loan categories violate the proportional odds assumption. The type of IMF loan 
does seem affect labor rights which suggests an avenue for future research. What is 
surprising is that non-concessional loans like ESF, EFF loans are associated with better 
labor rights that loans designed to protect the poor. The overall findings however suggest 
that even controlling for the type of loan, time under an IMF program, and the size of a 
loan compliance still has a statistically significant negative effect on labor rights. 
Appendix table 7a. Partial proportional odds 
model. IMF controls 
Model 12a Model 13a 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
Equation     
Beta Lagged DV 2.880*** 3.449*** 
  (0.286) (0.353) 
 IMF compliance -0.020*** -0.017** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan 1.087* -0.642 
  (0.653) (1.082) 
 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) 
loan 
12.987*** 12.510*** 
  (0.988) (0.923) 
 Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan 11.360*** 11.305*** 
  (1.248) (1.259) 
 Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) loan 
0.478 0.055 
  (0.378) (0.516) 
 Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan 0.128 -0.248 
  (0.625) (0.715) 
 Standby Arrangement (SBA) 0.089 -0.129 
  (0.511) (0.608) 
 Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan -1.570* -13.493*** 
  (0.895) (0.969) 
 Total access in millions of SDR 
logged 
-0.051 0.189* 
  (0.106) (0.096) 
 Years under IMF lending -0.027 0.019 
  (0.044) (0.058) 
 GDP growth -0.016 0.078** 
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  (0.047) (0.033) 
 Democracy 0.021 0.011 
  (0.028) (0.031) 
 Total Population logged -0.107 0.156 
  (0.148) (0.141) 
 GDP per capita logged 0.174 -0.109 
  (0.204) (0.197) 
 FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.032 -0.037 
  (0.082) (0.116) 
 Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.163 0.369 
  (0.419) (0.448) 
 Labor protest 0.188** 0.174*** 
  (0.090) (0.049) 
 Unemployment 0.013 0.017 
  (0.020) (0.023) 
 Leftist government -0.568* -0.782** 
  (0.316) (0.322) 
 Physical integrity rights index 0.132 0.421*** 
  (0.109) (0.115) 
 Probability of IMF exit 0.773 -2.944 
  (2.019) (2.344) 
 Constant -1.028 -7.017* 
  (4.050) (3.790) 
Gamma 
2 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan  2.174** 
   (0.914) 
 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) 
loan 
-12.046*** -10.806*** 
  (1.157) (1.284) 
 Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan -13.679*** -8.219*** 
  (1.199) (1.820) 
 Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan  1.712** 
   (0.788) 
 Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan -11.280*** 0.000 
  (0.956) (0.000) 
 Unemployment 0.013 -0.148*** 
  (0.020) (0.051) 
 Constant -5.646 -11.318*** 
  (4.050) (3.811) 
    
 Observations 404 404 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The reference category for the type of IMF loan is Extended Credit Facilities (ECF) 
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Appendix table 8a uses the collective labor practices and adds a number of non-IMF 
controls. The substantive results of this model are unchanged from chapter 1. Higher 
compliance generates a decline in labor rights. These include the electoral system, the 
number of years the executive has spent in office, US economic aid, how liberalized the 
country’s economy is, labor abundance, and remittances. Domestic electoral institutions 
and time in office are likely to play a large role in how leaders respond to the public will 
to respect labor rights. US economic aid to a country has been used in the literature as a 
proxy for whether leaders are likely to be punished for non-compliance. Economic 
liberalization affects how much the country benefits from austerity as the two are 
composed of similar policies. Remittances and labor abundance both shape the domestic 
power and resources available to labor. Labor abundant countries have been argued to 
benefit from IMF reforms. Remittances can serve as a substitute for declining wages as a 
result for labor practices which may make leaders more willing to enact anti-labor reform 
policies.  
Appendix table 8a. Model 14a Model 15a 
Non-IMF controls Ordered probit OLS with PCSE 
   
Lagged DV 0.413** 0.216*** 
 (0.162) (0.068) 
IMF compliance -0.011** -0.004** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
Assembly elected president -7.617*** -1.619*** 
 (0.774) (0.348) 
Presidential system -0.804 -0.563 
 (8.731) (2.764) 
Executive years in office -0.041 -0.018 
 (0.042) (0.015) 
US economic aid 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic liberalization  -0.980 -0.355** 
 (0.601) (0.181) 
Labor abundance -1.413e+07 -4.723e+07 
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 (3.598e+08) (1.875e+08) 
Remittance Inflows (US$ Billions) -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Democracy -0.129 -0.039 
 (0.099) (0.033) 
Population (logged) 0.687 0.283 
 (3.125) (1.018) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.745 0.152 
 (1.093) (0.417) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.280* -0.082 
 (0.151) (0.052) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 1.023 0.347 
 (1.058) (0.319) 
Labor protest 0.072 0.011 
 (0.081) (0.013) 
Unemployment -0.148*** -0.061*** 
 (0.046) (0.021) 
Leftist government -0.470 -0.255* 
 (0.330) (0.140) 
Physical integrity rights 0.149* 0.058 
 (0.088) (0.041) 
Probability of IMF exit 1.042 0.406 
 (1.627) (0.597) 
Cut 1 12.375  
 (53.220)  
Cut 2 13.485  
 (53.225)  
Cut 3 16.307  
 (53.222)  
Cut 4 18.387  
 (53.323)  
Constant  -3.361 
  (18.118) 
   
Observations 374 374 
R-squared 0.51 0.769 
Number of countries 70 70 
Fixed effects NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 This value corresponds to a pseudo R2 
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Appendix table 9a uses the same model specification as appendix table 8a but applies it 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Once again the results hold. Higher 
levels of IMF compliance are associated with a decrease in labor rights.  
Appendix table 9a. Non-IMF controls 
Partial proportional odds model 
Model 16a Model 17a 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
    
Beta Lagged DV 2.667*** 3.475*** 
  (0.307) (0.398) 
 IMF compliance -0.016** -0.015** 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
 Assembly elected president -0.305 -0.886*** 
  (0.403) (0.342) 
 Presidential system 0.637* -0.418 
  (0.363) (0.391) 
 Years of leader in office -0.002 -0.041* 
  (0.025) (0.023) 
 US economic aid -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Economic liberalization -0.435* -0.754*** 
  (0.244) (0.268) 
 Labor abundance 79310225.242 4.591e+08** 
  (1.887e+08) (1.999e+08) 
 GDP growth -0.025 0.073* 
  (0.043) (0.043) 
 Democracy 0.003 -0.033 
  (0.044) (0.045) 
 Total Population logged -0.188 0.239 
  (0.157) (0.176) 
 GDP per capita logged 0.213 0.967*** 
  (0.249) (0.275) 
 FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.103 0.135 
  (0.108) (0.127) 
 Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.024 0.433 
  (0.437) (0.531) 
 Labor protest 0.177** 0.211*** 
  (0.081) (0.078) 
 Unemployment 0.004 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.024) 
 Leftist government -0.647** -0.965** 
  (0.329) (0.377) 
 Physical integrity rights 
index 
0.134 0.398*** 
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  (0.105) (0.113) 
 Probability of IMF exit 1.333 -1.104 
  (2.088) (2.515) 
 Constant 3.386 -10.765* 
  (5.128) (5.883) 
Gamma 
2 
Assembly elected president -0.305 -12.743*** 
  (0.403) (0.859) 
 Unemployment 0.004 -0.149*** 
  (0.021) (0.050) 
 Constant 2 -1.204 -15.174** 
  (5.184) (5.986) 
    
 Observations 374 374 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix model 10a. uses bootstrapped standard errors to account for the fact that IMF 
compliance is a measure that likely has some error and that the probability of IMF exit is 
an estimate whose measurement error has not been accounted for. These models use 50 
replications. Bootsrapping does not change the findings of chapter 1. In all three models 
as compliance increases we see a decline in respect for labor rights. 
Appendix table 10a. Bootstrapped  
standard errors. Ordered probit  
Model 18a Model 19a Model 20a 
Collective labor  
practices 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
    
Collective labor practices 1.173*** 2.924*** 3.528*** 
 (0.111) (0.285) (0.285) 
IMF compliance -0.008** -0.016** -0.014* 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) 
Democracy 0.006 0.015 0.029 
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.037) 
Total Population logged -0.002 -0.146 0.220 
 (0.073) (0.153) (0.192) 
GDP per capita logged 0.039 0.082 0.046 
 (0.066) (0.116) (0.165) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.011 0.009 0.023 
 (0.062) (0.123) (0.168) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.120 0.104 0.488 
 (0.223) (0.428) (0.519) 
Labor protest 0.111** 0.187 0.145** 
 (0.047) (0.128) (0.069) 
Unemployment 0.001 0.012 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) 
Leftist government -0.302** -0.529* -0.712* 
 (0.146) (0.299) (0.369) 
Physical integrity rights index 0.126** 0.163 0.373*** 
 (0.053) (0.114) (0.113) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.532 0.411 -2.668 
 (0.998) (2.111) (1.891) 
/cut1 1.606 -0.121 8.469 
 (2.083) (4.018) (5.415) 
/cut2 2.454 4.434 13.702** 
 (2.107) (3.990) (5.476) 
/cut3 4.531** - - 
 (2.130)   
/cut4 5.879*** - - 
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 (2.137)   
    
Observations 404 404 404 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 11a re-runs the model from table 1 in chapter 1 using a sample of non-
OECD countries. Once again the results are unchanged. Higher levels of compliance 
leads to a decline in respect for labor rights.  
Appendix table 11a. Non-OECD sample Model 21a Model 22a 
Freedom of 
association 
Collective 
bargaining 
Equation    
Beta Lagged DV 2.827*** 3.385*** 
  (0.285) (0.356) 
 IMF compliance -0.018*** -0.009 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
 GDP growth -0.012 0.078** 
  (0.042) (0.034) 
 Democracy 0.025 0.022 
  (0.027) (0.030) 
 Total Population logged -0.147 0.065 
  (0.127) (0.135) 
 GDP per capita logged -0.023 -0.135 
  (0.135) (0.141) 
 FDI (% of GDP logged) 0.038 -0.001 
  (0.080) (0.116) 
 Trade (% of GDP logged) 0.191 0.101 
  (0.367) (0.471) 
 Labor protest 0.135 0.196** 
  (0.095) (0.092) 
 Unemployment 0.008 0.008 
  (0.018) (0.022) 
 Leftist government -0.433 -0.732** 
  (0.305) (0.346) 
 Physical integrity rights 
index 
0.140 0.361*** 
  (0.101) (0.111) 
 Probability of IMF exit -0.401 -0.798 
  (2.201) (2.638) 
 Collective bargaining  3.385*** 
   (0.356) 
 Constant 0.792 -3.650 
  (3.359) (3.713) 
Gamma 
2 
IMF compliance  -0.052*** 
   (0.013) 
 Unemployment  -0.154** 
   (0.061) 
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 Constant 2 -3.734 -6.263* 
  (3.369) (3.634) 
    
 Observations 383 383 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2:  Compliance with IMF Austerity and Violent Protest 
Like most of the world, Greece was thrown into economic crisis after the global 
recession of 2007. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth hit a 50 year low of -9% in 
2011, and youth unemployment peaked at 58.2% in 2013. Unable to address its economic 
woes, Greece accepted a bailout package in May of 2010 negotiated with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank, and the European 
Commission. In exchange for the loan Greece agreed to implement a set of austerity 
policies that made significant cuts to pensions, social services, wages, and public-sector 
employment.  
Austerity imposed at the behest of the IMF bailout was “harsher” than previous 
reform efforts resulting in widespread unrest. On May 5, 2010, as the Greek Parliament 
voted on austerity measures, a large, anti-austerity protest in Athens erupted into 
violence. Masked youths threw petrol bombs and clashed with police. Protesters 
destroyed property and citizens were killed. Police responded by throwing tear gas at 
violent and non-violent protesters alike leading to claims of police repression. By the end 
of 2010, between 239,000 and 422,000 protesters had taken to the streets participating in 
12 violent protests (all against austerity), 11 of which resulted in clashes with police.124 
                                                      
124 Estimates are taken from the Mass Mobilization Protest Dataset using both a conservative estimate and a 
liberal estimate of participants variable. See Clark and Regan 2016 
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This anti-austerity movement proved to be quite different than the protests that came 
before it and continues at the time of this writing.125 
Debate over pension reform in 2007 sparked a series of non-violent protests, but 
both confrontations between protesters and police and the use of violence by protesters 
were rare. Liberal democratic institutions ensured that protesters could take to the streets 
to air their demands, and a competitive electoral system allowed for citizens to replace 
leaders who they disliked. Greece (even in crisis) is a developed country with a high 
standard of living relative to the rest of the world. For all of these reasons, it is surprising 
to see violence used by citizens as a political tool. So why did violence erupt in Greece? 
What was so different about citizen’s grievances in 2010? Austerity.  
Violence is one of the largest obstacles to development. When violence begins it 
is difficult to stop and has significant economic costs that could potentially outweigh any 
economic gains generated by austerity. Past work argues that austerity generates 
collective violence by creating grievances among those who lose out during the reform 
process. The empirical work testing this relationship has treated IMF austerity as either a 
dichotomous state of being (you are under austerity or you are not) or looked at how long 
a country spends under austerity. Although this work finds a significant relationship 
between IMF program lending and collective violence, it offers few explanations for why 
we see violence in Greece but not in Cape Verde or Albania when all three underwent 
IMF austerity. This work also fails to explain why we see variation within countries over 
time. Violent protests in Greece were widespread from 2010-2012, rare in 2013 and 
2014, and widespread again in 2015 and 2016. Overall, past work has been limited by the 
                                                      
125 2018 
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scarcity of IMF data. This paper introduces a new measure on IMF compliance that helps 
explain these differences. 
If IMF conditionality generates violent conflict, this may undermine many of the 
arguments for economic austerity. “If the programmes are rendered inoperative by 
political unrest, the question of their economic feasibility becomes largely academic.” 126 
Leaders may be unwilling to implement reforms if they believe that these reforms will 
lead to violence. Alternatively, austerity may lead to the replacement of austerity-friendly 
leaders with those championing anti-austerity platforms thereby altering the entire 
political landscape.127  
This paper explores IMF austerity and its effect on violent protest. Three 
arguments are put forth to explain variation in violent protest between IMF borrowers 
and within IMF borrowers over time. First, loans with less severe austerity generate less 
violence. Second, violent protest increases as countries implement a larger percentage of 
IMF austerity conditions. And finally, violent protest follows a cubic relationship with 
the amount of time spent under IMF lending. Violent protest is highest in the beginning 
of austerity, but subsides over time. However, once the consequences of austerity policy 
begin to set in, and governments are forced to take out new loans, protest will increase 
again.128 These arguments are tested using negative binomial models on a sample of 78 
IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. I find support for the second and third argument 
suggesting that compliance and the amount of time a country spends under IMF lending 
                                                      
126 Auvinen 1996, p.377 
127 IMF programs undermine leader survival (Dreher 2004, Dreher et al. 2012).  
128 IMF loans last 1-4 years. If a country is still in need of assistance then they must take out a new loan.  
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provide two explanations for the variance in violent protest levels in countries under IMF 
lending.  
International Monetary Fund Austerity  
Austerity refers to a policy package which promotes a reduction in government 
spending and the promotion of business-friendly reforms.129 These reforms shift power 
away from the state and towards the market.130 Austerity is distinguished from similar 
types of economic reform in both the speed at which it is carried out and the starting 
economic conditions. It promotes such rapid economic change through the adoption of 
multiple neoliberal reform policies that it has sometimes been referred to as “shock-
therapy.” 131 Austerity also occurs during times of economic trouble which distinguish it 
from similar reforms during times of growth. Countries may choose austerity themselves 
(such as Spain or the United Kingdom in the last decade) or in exchange for a loan from 
an international lending institution such as the International Monetary Fund (for example, 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in the last decade).  
IMF austerity refers to the conditionality attached to IMF lending. The IMF 
provides loans to countries facing economic crisis, and in exchange those countries must 
implement austerity reforms. Past work argues that IMF austerity is a one-size-fits-all 
package.132 The specifics of IMF conditionality may change, but the underlying policies 
themselves and what they aim to accomplish are remarkably similar. Privatization, de-
                                                      
129 See Stiglitz 20002; Vreeland 2007 for an overview of these policies 
130 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009 
131 See Klein 2007 
132 See Stiglitz 2002; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie, Bauer 2010 
95 
 
regulation of the labor market, free trade policies, cuts to the social welfare state, de-
regulation of the finance industry, and other policies associated with the “Washington 
Consensus” have made up the core of austerity reforms. 133, 134 These reforms are argued 
to promote growth, attract investment, and help countries resolve economic crises, but 
much of the empirical literature has found little support for these arguments.135 
Variation in the design of IMF conditionality and the implementation of 
conditionality has been increasingly recognized in the literature as an explanation for the 
poor outcomes associated with IMF borrowers.136 However, much of the empirical 
literature on IMF austerity has been constrained to using rather blunt measures: being 
under an IMF program (0/1), the number of conditions, time under IMF lending, or 
drawing on loan disbursements. These measures are much too coarse to capture the true 
variation in IMF agreements. These agreements can vary widely; some agreements carry 
reforms for every aspect of governance while others only affect a few areas of policy.137 
Some reforms require the passage of legislation while others simply call for the collection 
of data, publishing reports, or drafting plans for future changes. Finally, some borrowers 
actually implement the reforms attached to IMF loans while others do not. All three of 
these generate significant variation in the consequences of IMF lending. Past work tends 
                                                      
133 In the 21st century this is sometimes referred to as the post-Washington Consensus.  
134 See Stiglitz 2002 
135 See Dreher 2006, Jensen 2007 
136 See Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009; Stone 2008 
137 Stone 2008 
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to explain how these sources of variation might affect outcomes of interest, but then use 
blunt measures which capture none of this variation.   
If the IMF operated as a purely technocratic organization, and countries were left 
to implement the policies with no interference from powerful IMF member countries, the 
IMF should generate economic recovery.138 Unfortunately, IMF programs have 
consistently failed to promote economic recovery.139 The debate over why IMF programs 
are failing can be can be simplified to (1) too much compliance or (2) not enough 
compliance. I call those who blame high levels of compliance policy critics because they 
believe austerity policies are to blame. Those who adhere to the second explanation I call 
institutional critics because they believe the IMF as an International Organization is 
doing a poor job of ensuring compliance with the difficult but necessary economic 
reforms. 
 If the problem is that austerity leads to conflict and harms human rights, then 
compliance with reforms is responsible for negative outcomes. If, on the other hand, 
countries are not implementing reforms due to political interference, adverse selection, 
and moral hazard then studies tying poor outcomes to IMF austerity are misplaced. 
Instead, the poor outcomes are the result of countries not enacting reforms. One reason to 
believe that low-compliance may be causing conflict recently is that the IMF has 
reformed program lending in the 21st century. Just because past IMF agreements were 
harmful does not mean they still are. In order to determine which of these explanations is 
                                                      
138 See Stone 2008, 2011; Bas and Stone 2014;  
139 See Dreher 2009 
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correct, we must be able to measure and test the direct effect of compliance on outcomes 
of interest.  
Twenty-first century IMF loans vary quite a bit. First, compliance with 
conditionality ranges from 0% (Tunisia’s Standby Agreement in 2013) to 100% 
(Guatemala’s Standby Agreement in 2010) with most countries implementing around 
39% of the agreed upon conditions in any given year. Put simply, collective violence in 
countries that implement 0% of policies cannot be caused by austerity because austerity 
was not imposed.  
In addition, there are many different types of IMF loans: Extended Credit Facility, 
Exogenous Shocks Facility, Precautionary Credit Line, Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility, Extended Fund Facility, Policy Support Instrument, Standby Agreement, and the 
Standby Credit Facility. Some of these are designed to reduce poverty and ensure social 
protections remain which sounds quite different from the austerity described by critics of 
the IMF. In addition, other loans are taken out as a precaution and carry few conditions. 
Both of these distinctions imply that some types of loans are less severe than others. 
Finally, some countries take out multiple IMF loans back to back (for example, 
Greece) while others take out only a single loan. Citizens in the first group of countries 
may become disillusion with austerity and angry that it has not led to growth. This has 
the potential to generate violent protest every time a new loan is taken out or new policies 
are announced/implemented. Citizens in the second group of countries may protest 
austerity in the beginning but settle down over time because when the loan ends life 
returns to normal. In this way, the amount of time a country spends under IMF lending 
can have a large impact on collective violence.   
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 The variation in compliance with austerity, the type of IMF loans, and the time 
under IMF lending may help explain variation in conflict outcomes among IMF 
borrowers. This paper tests whether these three mechanisms can explain variation in 
violent protest between borrowers and within borrowers over time. If institutional critics 
are correct, then austerity itself is not to blame for collective violence; had countries 
implemented more policies then things would have been better. On the other hand, if the 
policy critics are correct, then higher compliance should lead to an increase in collective 
violence. 
IMF Generated Grievances and Collective Violence 
Collective violence often gets the attention of the state better than non-violence.140 
The destruction of property and use of violence sends signals about how intense citizen 
demands are, which also attracts media attention. The strategic use of violence has 
benefits even if in the long run non-violent movements may be more successful at 
achieving their aims. 141, 142 The use of violence runs the risk of activating emotional 
responses that ignore strategic intent.143 Emotions are often ignored in the social sciences 
even though grievance theory builds upon anger, injustice, and fairness as emotions 
which lend themselves to mobilization. In truth, both the strategic use of violence and the 
unplanned spontaneous eruption of violence are hard to disentangle. I do not disentangle 
this relationship here either, but instead argue that IMF austerity makes violence more 
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likely either as a strategic decision or as an emotional response to human rights 
violations.  
Grievance theories tying IMF austerity to collective violence are common in both 
the literature and news accounts of IMF protests. 144, 145 By design, IMF austerity places 
the costs of reform on the poor, workers, and other vulnerable groups in society.146 Past 
work ties IMF lending to the violation of women’s rights; 147 declining health 
outcomes;148 economic rights’ violations;149 reduced social spending;150 and increased 
poverty and inequality.151 There is also a large literature tying IMF austerity to 
deteriorating labor conditions such as: declining union participation, 152 lower wages,153 
less government respect for worker rights,154 and increased violations of overall labor 
rights in law and practice.155  
These undesirable effects are argued to be a short-term affair that governments 
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can reverse once the economy improves; unfortunately, this is seldom the case in 
practice. The grievances that result from reform are deeply felt. Many citizens lose their 
livelihoods and ability to support their families while being pushed into poverty. Others 
slip through without becoming impoverished, but lose their entire savings. In this way, 
the extent of these grievances leaves citizens with much more to lose from not speaking 
up. When ignored or repressed, these grievances have the potential to generate 
widespread violence. Violence may be an emotional response as citizens feel there are no 
lawful avenues through which they can seek redress, or a tactic meant to force the 
government to respond to the aggrieved. The underlying commonality here is that IMF 
austerity creates conditions in which collective violence is more likely.  
 Empirical evidence often finds that IMF programs not only fail to promote 
economic growth but may actually hinder growth.156 The violation of economic rights 
and a slowdown of economic recovery creates a feeling of relative deprivation. Austerity 
reforms make things worse than had the country not chosen austerity. Economic 
deprivation has long been theorized to create conflict between dissidents and the state, 
and the violation of economic rights has also been tied to conflict onset. 157, 158 Beyond 
simply causing hardship (which is always the case during an economic crisis) these 
policies are also popularly seen as unfair by the general public.  
IMF reforms are unpopular both for the hardships they impose on citizens and for 
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their perceived “unfairness.” A 2012 MRB Greek poll found that 90% of Greeks thought 
spending cuts were unfair, burdened the poor, and would be accompanied by more 
austerity in the future.159 Fairness plays an important role in grievance theories of 
mobilization. In relative deprivation theories, citizens believe they are worse off than they 
should be; this inequity is unfair, causes anger, and leads to collective violence. Finally, 
behavioral studies show that individuals are willing to pay non-trivial private costs to 
punish violations of social norms and perceived unfairness.160  
Further, people tend to over-value losses relative to potential gains.161 In the case 
of austerity, potential gains are made in the long run while the costs are borne out heavily 
in the short run (j-curve).162 High short-term costs such as cuts to the welfare state 
represent very real losses that can push families into poverty. These costs are not 
distributed equally which creates a sense of unfairness. The potential benefits of reform 
may never arrive if IMF programs do not lead to growth, and citizens have good reason 
to doubt whether austerity will ever generate benefits.  
The prospect that this time IMF austerity will work when it has failed so many 
times before (or is perceived to have failed) is hard for citizens to swallow. Policy 
debates in scholarly literature and the media are increasingly skeptical about austerity’s 
ability to deliver growth.163 Plus, while developed countries like the United States 
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advocate austerity, they themselves are not willing to use it when faced with economic 
trouble. Instead, stimulus packages (expanding the budget as opposed to shrinking it) in 
the United States and EU countries are used. Stimulus is not available to IMF borrowers 
because austerity is at its core a budget-cutting policy. The combination of economic 
hardship and perceived injustice allows citizens to overcome collective action problems 
and engage in collective violence. 
Theoretical work on grievance and conflict onset is large and often ties anger at 
real and perceived injustice to violence.164 However, the empirical literature has found 
little support for grievance theories of conflict, favoring theories of greed instead. This 
may be due to problems of measurement though. Most of the measures used (the gini 
index or ethnic fractionalization, for example) are chosen for their availability rather than 
their validity, and invalid measures could be responsible for null findings. If this is the 
case, then further empirical work with better measures is necessary.165  
In addition, the focus on the individual (i.e. rationalist choice theories) can be 
problematic for understanding collective violence. Group inequalities can be more 
relevant than individual inequalities suggesting that a more refined and valid measure of 
economic inequity is necessary. Indeed, scholars have found a strong empirical 
relationship between group-level economic inequality and conflict.166 This appears to be 
especially true during times of macroeconomic trouble where scholars have found that 
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overcoming collective actions problems is easier.167  
This paper agrees that IMF austerity generates grievances. It is widely agreed that 
IMF programs are unpopular and the literature tying them to economic deprivation (such 
as inequality, poverty, declining labor rights, increased violations of economic rights) 
comes as close to a consensus as exists in political science. The IMF creates a focal point 
for the losers to rally around, and austerity, by definition, comes during times of crisis 
when it is easier to overcome collective action problems. All of this works to make IMF 
austerity a catalyst for collective violence, but not all austerity is the same. 
Design 
IMF austerity varies in design, level of compliance, and time under. IMF 
conditionality is designed to consider a country’s capacity for reform, the political 
environment, and requires explicit agreement from a country’s leader. The resulting 
austerity forms an international agreement to reform a country’s economy in exchange 
for a loan. However, both the extent of the crisis and the type of loan vary. For example, 
some IMF programs have been designed to reduce poverty and ensure social protections 
remain (especially those associated with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust). Some 
loans are short term (Standby Arrangements typically last 1 to 2 years) while others are 
designed to last for a longer period (Extended Fund Facility loans are usually 3 or 4 
years). Some loans are concessional (Extended Credit Facility), others are not (Standby 
Agreements). Finally, some are designed specifically to help low-income countries 
(Extended Credit Facility), while others are precautionary (Precautionary Credit Line). 
All of this variation in loan type should have different consequences for the grievances 
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created, and therefore for collective violence. A paucity of data in the past makes this the 
first work to analyze the relationship between different types of loans and collective 
violence.  
Loans which aim to reduce poverty and protect social welfare provisions will 
generate fewer grievances. If these loans do promote pro-poor growth, then the negative 
consequences of IMF austerity should be less severe. While the IMF has not taken steps 
to incorporate human rights into its lending, loans which are aimed at alleviating poverty 
are an attempt to reconcile IMF austerity with the need to protect vulnerable groups in 
society which suggests that concessional lending under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Trust should lead to less violence than other lending instruments. If true, then this 
would provide evidence that the IMF can tailor some loans in ways that reduce their 
effects on vulnerable populations and minimize economic rights violations.   
Next, loans that are taken out as a precaution tend to have fewer conditions 
attached to them. These loans can also be described as less severe as they tend require 
less on the part of the state. This is only possible because the IMF is acting preventively 
rather than trying to correct a deep structural fault which has caused a crisis. The 
distinction between preventive and corrective reform has been held up as evidence of 
IMF lending restructuring in the 21st century. However, many remain skeptical arguing 
that the underlying agreements themselves have changed very little and this is simply 
rhetoric to cover up for the failure of austerity as a reform package.168 If critics are right 
that IMF austerity is the same regardless of the type of loan, then loan type should have 
no effect on conflict because all loans are the same. I test this critique with Hypothesis 1. 
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H1: Stricter IMF loan conditionality causes more collective 
violence than flexible IMF loan conditionality 
 
Compliance 
 
In addition to loan type differences, compliance with IMF austerity also varies 
widely. It has long been recognized that while leaders agree to implement IMF austerity 
they rarely follow through on this commitment. Compliance with IMF lending is 
notoriously low: between 2002 and 2014 the average level of compliance is 39%, and this 
pattern is not new. 169, 170 Previous work simply assumes whether or not leaders have 
implemented reforms, but it is vitally important to know the actual level of compliance. If 
reforms are not being made, then they cannot be responsible for any outcomes:  positive 
or negative. Non-compliance suggests that outcomes of interest are generated by some 
other factor. In this way, the actual level of compliance with reforms may be the single 
most important determinant of whether austerity generates conflict. This paper uses a 
new measure of compliance taken from the SCIP dataset to directly test if and how 
compliance affects collective violence. 
Grievance theory suggests that greater levels of compliance should generate more 
grievances. Since greater compliance is associated with more reforms which affects a 
larger share of citizens, as compliance with IMF austerity increases we should also see a 
rise in violence. The reverse side of this is that if compliance decreases we should see a 
decline in violence because there are fewer grievances generated. Less compliance might 
also be viewed as accommodation to aggrieved citizen’s demands. This suggests a second 
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hypothesis where IMF austerity refers to the actual implementation of austerity policies:  
H2: As compliance with IMF conditionality increases 
collective violence also increases    
 
Time 
Finally, the amount of time a country spends under IMF austerity is also 
important for explaining levels of collective violence. While under IMF austerity, the 
political opportunity for mobilization against the government changes.171 While all 
societies have inequities, individuals rarely mobilize to overthrow or change the regime. 
Most economic policies create winners and losers, yet the losers rarely have the ability to 
organize. This is why we do not see the poor always engaging in violent collective action. 
Before participating in collective violence, individuals first weigh the costs and potential 
benefits. The costs and benefits depend on the probability of policy concessions versus 
probability of punishment. These probabilities are made up of a variety of other factors, 
like the likelihood others join in, the private spoils to be won, possible international 
attention garnered by the movement, and the strength of the state.  
Put very simply, individuals engage in dissent when they stand to gain more from 
it than they risk losing. Political opportunity is one way to think about the variations in 
these costs and benefits. When the benefits outweigh the costs, political opportunity is 
high, but when the costs outweigh the benefits, then political opportunity is low. This 
framework explains both the decision to rebel and the decision to protest. 172, 173  
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IMF austerity creates the grievances necessary for collective violence, but when 
should we expect this violence to take place? In the Greek case, violent opposition was 
strong at the start of IMF austerity but waned in the years after before picking up again. 
Cycles of violence are well established in the conflict literature.174 Once violence 
emerges it is hard to break the cycle. Violent protest may lead to repression by state 
agents which creates grievances generating new acts of violence.175 This paper argues 
that violent protests under IMF austerity follow what Tarrow (1993, 2011) calls protest 
cycles.176 That is, protest movements tend to have a cyclical relationship with time.  
Collective violence is not constant throughout the course of an IMF program. 
There are several reasons for this. First, uncertainty about compliance, and state 
incentives to comply with reforms, are largest at the start of an IMF program but become 
more certain as time passes. Second, actors who protest violently adopt more effective 
strategies for mobilizing over time. Third, the effects of IMF austerity and decisions to 
sign up for subsequent loans provide new focal points for dissent and opportunities to try 
to alter state behavior. Collective violence is also likely to be met with repression which 
generates new grievances sparking further violence. 
 Violent protest should be largest at the start of an IMF program. The 
announcement of austerity triggers a popular backlash as citizens and civil society groups 
push back against reforms that are likely to hurt them. 177 Plus, at the beginning everyone 
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(citizens, market actors, and the IMF) is uncertain about whether leaders will comply 
with reforms or not, and since compliance is often low, domestic groups have incentives 
to try to force leaders not to enact reforms which may harm them.178, 179 Protestors draw 
on past experiences under austerity, the experience of other countries under austerity, and 
cues from elites who explain how these policies will negatively impact them and whether 
there are alternatives (like stimulus). Violence may emerge spontaneously in response to 
state behavior (i.e. police repression or harassment) or as a function of how much 
individuals have lost or will lose in the near future. Others may purposefully plan to use 
violence during protests believing that this will further their cause.   
 Over time, as the level of austerity becomes known and protester fatigue sets in 
there will be a decline in violent protests. Decisions regarding how much a leader will 
comply tend to settle into equilibrium. For example, Greece saw low compliance in the 
first year of its loan (around 21%) in subsequent years the level of compliance remained 
largely the same (hovering between 44% and 52% over the next five years). Protester 
fatigue occurs as a result of leader responses to protests (it seems hopeless so people give 
up) and as a natural consequence of the time and effort it takes to protest. Work, family, 
and social obligations all make protesting a costly endeavor. Violent protest all the more 
so since individuals risk being arrested or worse. Eventually individuals find new work or 
accept the changes/promises that have been made, yet grievances remain.  
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 Although violent protests diminish in the years after an IMF program begins, it 
often resurges over time. The loose collective of organizations and individuals protesting 
austerity becomes more professional over time. These organizations band together and 
strategies for confronting the state and expressing grievances become more complex. One 
way this violence resurges is when the effects of austerity accumulate. Over time as more 
austerity policies are implemented grievances grow.180 Protests may also resurface when 
leaders sign up for a second or third loan, and it becomes increasingly clear that austerity 
has not promoted growth and will continue to undermine economic rights. These events 
create focal points for new acts of collective violence and may trigger a resurgence of 
violent protest. If governments choose to repress or ignore these grievances, this can 
produce even more violence. Ignoring grievances can cause citizens to choose violence as 
a way to force the government to accommodate. The use of repression may lead to an 
increase in violence by the aggrieved.181 Government promises to address grievances may 
also fall short.  In Greece, Syriza came to power in 2015 with a far-left agenda and an 
adamantly anti-IMF mandate which decreased violent protests, but when the party 
eventually caved and agreed to more austerity, violent protests surged again.  
 Altogether, this process suggests that the relationship between IMF austerity and 
violent protest is cyclical. Violent protest is large at the start of an IMF program, 
diminishes in subsequent years, rises again, and diminishes again. How the government 
responds to protests has a large impact on whether violent protests end (if protester 
demands are met, promises made, or a leader is replaced) or escalate. On average this 
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cyclical pattern may help explain violent protest variation within countries. While 
individuals may deviate, countries that get trapped in an endless IMF cycle are subject to 
continued cycles of violence.  
 This cycle explains the variation in Greek protests quite well. Greece saw 37 
violent protests between 2010 and 2012. In the next two years there were only five 
violent protests though this number rose once again to 8 violent protests in 2015 and 
continued increasing in 2016. Greece saw waves of violent protest that ebbed and flowed 
in the ways described above.182 
H3: Acts of collective violence follow a cyclical 
relationship with the time a country spends under IMF 
lending 
 
The preceding hypotheses suggest three different explanation about whether IMF 
lending will generate violence. The type of loan, compliance with lending decisions, and 
the time a country spends under IMF lending. The next section discusses research design 
used to test whether there is empirical support for these mechanisms. 
Research Design  
 There are a number of challenges to empirically testing the relationship between 
IMF austerity and collective violence. This paper advances the empirical literature on 
IMF austerity and conflict by offering a new dataset that provides much more detail about 
IMF lending including a direct measure of compliance. This new measure of compliance 
alleviates the issues of adverse selection and measurement that typically hinder research 
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on IMF lending.183 Further, even if adverse selection does occur it would result in low 
values on compliance.  
 Unfortunately, a number of additional challenges remain. First, countries only 
sign up for IMF lending when they face economic trouble, and it does not make sense to 
compare healthy economies with those in crisis. Second, IMF borrowers are a non-
random sample of countries. Besides economic crisis, the literature has pointed towards a 
number of political and economic institutions which both make the IMF more likely to 
extend funds and countries more likely to ask for funds.184 Third, much of the literature 
has paid scant attention to the appropriate comparison group.185 One comparison is 
between IMF borrowers and non-borrowers. This comparison tells us whether a country 
is worse off under IMF austerity than it would have been without the IMF. Controlling 
for economic crisis, do countries which reform under the IMF see more conflict than 
those which do not?  An alternative comparison is between IMF borrowers. This does not 
allow for comparison to non-IMF countries, but does allow for a more direct test of how 
different loans types and different levels of compliance among IMF borrowers affects 
violence. If a country had implemented another 20% of conditions, would that lead to 
more violence or less violence? Here, I opt for the second comparison group. Given that 
compliance data is missing for non-IMF borrowers this allows for the most direct test of 
the hypotheses outlined above.  
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 This paper uses a sample that consists of only IMF borrowers. This significantly 
reduces the sample size, but has the benefit of directly comparing IMF borrowers with 
other IMF borrowers. This sample provides answers to the questions of what would have 
happened had a country had a different loan type, implemented a greater/lesser number of 
austerity conditions, or was under IMF austerity for a longer time-period rather than the 
answer to what would happen if the country was not under IMF lending at all. With this 
sample, selection into an IMF program can be set aside although this sample choice does 
diminish the ability to generalize the findings outside of IMF borrowers.186 Finally, this 
choice of sample also avoids coding the implementation of austerity policies as 0% for 
non-borrowers which is not accurate as non-IMF countries did not have the chance to 
implement any reforms.  
 The models below explore IMF austerity between 2002 and 2014. The sample 
consists of 78 IMF borrowers. The unit of analysis is country-year. Negative binomial 
models are used as they are designed to address count data that has a large number of 
zero’s and is over-dispersed.187 Finally, all control variables are lagged one year to ensure 
proper order of causality. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable in all models is the number of violent protests in a 
country-year. Violent protest often precedes more extreme instances of collective 
violence such as terrorism or rebellion. Violent protests get the attention of media and 
often force the state to respond either by using force itself (repress) or accommodating 
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protester demands. These protests damage property, injure lives, and may scare away 
investors which IMF borrowers are hoping to lure in.188 Violent protest therefore captures 
the first stages of collective violence that may occur in response to austerity. From a 
policy perspective, explaining what it is about IMF lending that generates violent protest 
is necessary for reforming IMF program lending.  
The number of violent protest in a year comes from the Mass Mobilization dataset 
developed by Regan and Clark (2016) of which the author helped collect and code. 
Protests are coded out of newspapers and newswires using LexisNexis. A protest is 
defined as a gathering of 50 or more individuals who collectively make a demand of the 
government. The demand must address state policy or be targeted at the state or its 
agents. This excludes protests against the IMF within a state that do not make an explicit 
demand of the government. Violent protests are those in which protesters engage in 
violence against the state, property, or other citizens. This measure has the advantage of 
capturing cases of collective violence aimed at the state rather than international 
organizations, other states, or other domestic groups. This variable captures a sample of 
protest events rather than the universe of cases. The dependent variable is a count 
measure with a mode of 0 and fits a poisson distribution with over dispersion as it is 
heavily skewed to the right and has an excess of zeroes. 
Independent Variables 
 The first set of independent variables are taken from the State-level Compliance 
with IMF Programs dataset (SCIP) developed by the author. This dataset codes 
compliance with IMF lending at the country-year level between 2002 and 2014. Data is 
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coded out of the IMF MONA database and includes over 34,000 condition evaluations by 
the IMF executive board. The dataset also provides information on the type of loan that a 
country takes out, the size of the loan, and whether loans were precautionary.  
 In order to evaluate hypothesis 1 a dichotomous variable concessional is used. 
This variable is coded 1 if the IMF lending instrument was concessional and 0 if it was 
not. Concessional lending refers to IMF instruments which offer interest rates that are 
below market value and/or offer a longer repayment period. Concessional instruments 
include: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), Extended Credit Facility 
(ECD), Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), and Standby Credit Facility (SCF). These 
loans are given out under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and aimed at low-
income countries. They differ from non-concessional loans in the addition of poverty 
reduction conditions and floors on social spending. Non-concessional loans include: 
Standby Agreements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Precautionary Credit Line 
(PCL), and the Policy Support Instrument (PSI). According to the theory, concessional 
loans should produce fewer acts of collective violence because they are designed to 
reduce poverty and protect vulnerable groups. The conditionality attached to these loans 
should therefore be less stringent.  
 A second dichotomous measure looks at whether an IMF loan was precautionary. 
Precautionary loans tend to encompass less harsh austerity because the extent of the 
economic crisis is not as bad. These loans are often taken out as insurance and, as a 
result, tend to have fewer conditions attached to them. This suggests that precautionary 
loans should generate fewer acts of collective violence. Both precautionary and 
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concessional lending are argued to be less strict than non-concessional lending, therefore, 
the coefficients on these variables should be negative.  
 Hypothesis 2 is tested using a measure of IMF austerity implementation. This 
variable measures the proportion of IMF conditions that have been met in a country-year. 
It is coded as the number of conditions met divided by the total number of conditions that 
were evaluated in a year by the IMF Executive Board. This variable ranges between 0% 
and 100% of conditions met with a sample mean of 40% among IMF borrowers. I expect 
the coefficient on IMF compliance to be negative. It is coded from 0 to 1 with 0 
representing 0% of conditions met and 1 representing 100% of conditions met.   
 Finally, the third hypothesis argues that there is a cyclical relationship between 
time under IMF austerity and collective violence. I use a cubic polynomial of time under 
IMF lending to test this hypothesis. In all, this specification adds three variables: IMF 
years, IMF years2, and IMF years3. Time under IMF lending refers to the number of 
continuous years a country has spent under IMF lending since 2002.  
Control Variables 
 The number of violent protests in the last year is included as a control variable. 
Violent protest tends to be a dynamic process that builds upon past success and failures. 
Often, once violence breaks out it can spread and expand. The number of non-violent 
protests in the last year is also included as a control variable. Where protest is more 
common, we should see a rise in violent protest.189 Whenever there are non-violent 
protests there is the potential for them to spiral into violent protest as all protest involves 
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some form of confrontation between protesters and police. Both of these variables are 
taken from the Mass Mobilization protest dataset.  
 Next, regime type may affect both the decision to implement reforms and the 
amount of violent protests in a year.190 Democratic countries tend to incorporate the right 
to protest, have a free press, and have greater accountability which gives protesters other 
avenues for expressing grievances (such as elections) and decreases the likelihood of 
protests turning violent. To control for regime type, I include the polity2 ordinal scale 
from the Polity IV dataset. It ranges from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more 
democratic country.  
 I also control for the logged values of total population and GDP per capita. More 
populous countries tend to have more violence because there are more citizens to engage 
in confrontations with the state. Wealthier countries tend to have fewer violent protests as 
stronger states are able to buy off dissidents, credibly threaten to repress, and provide 
citizens with a higher standard of living (reducing the number of things to protest 
over).191 
 Repression of dissidents also effects the level of political violence. It can increase 
political violence by creating new grievances or reduce violence by increasing the cost of 
dissent.192 For this reason, I include a measure of protester repression coded out of the 
Mass Mobilization dataset. This allows me to control for protests which might arise from 
the repression of past protests. The included variable is an additive index of the number 
                                                      
190 See Oatley 2004; Schwarzmantel 2010 
191 Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hendrix 2010 
192 Moore 1998; Young 2013; Ritter and Conrad 2016 
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of times state agents used repressive tactics (arrests, beatings, shooting, killings, and 
crowd dispersal) against protestors in the last year. This count may exceed the number of 
protests if state agents used multiple types of repression against protesters. For example, 
a single protest might see police beat protesters, arrest them, and shoot them. The number 
of repressive events would be coded as 3 while the number of protests is coded as 1. In 
general protests which see multiple forms of repression tend to capture more intense acts 
of repression. I expect that when protesters in the previous year are repressed we are 
more likely to see an increase in violent protest this year.  
A Note on Selection 
Controlling for the probability of exit alleviates issues of non-random sample 
selection as the decision to exit an IMF program is based on similar factors as the 
decision to enter one.193 To control for this, I design a logistic regression model 
predicting early exit from IMF lending. The decision to end an IMF program early is a 
function of: economic conditions, the willingness of the IMF to lend, and political 
considerations. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if an IMF program ended earlier 
than it was scheduled (both in the original agreement and in revisions of that agreement) 
and 0 if it did not end early in a given year. Early exit is a function of economic health 
(current account balance, inflation, GDP growth, and overall wealth), political 
considerations (regime type), and the willingness of the IMF to continue lending (the 
number of IMF borrowers, US economic aid), as well as yearly fixed effects which 
capture variation in IMF funding and external shocks (such as the global recession). The 
predicted values of this equation are then included as a control variable to capture both 
                                                      
193 Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 
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selection into an IMF program and the probability that a country ends an IMF program 
early. This equation and a discussion of the model specification can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Results 
 Table 1 shows the results for four negative binomial regressions. The first three 
models test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 respectively; the fourth model tests these hypotheses 
jointly. The control variables behave similarly in all of the models. Countries with large 
populations tend to see more violent protests.194 Similarly, when governments have 
repressed protesters in the past there is an increase in violent protest. This matches past 
research which suggests that repression can create new grievances.195 Although caution 
should be taken as the relationship between repression and protest is dynamic and 
complex. Countries which had more violent protests in the previous year tend to have 
more protests in the current year. This is consistent with work showing that conflict is 
contagious. Finally, as the probability of exit increases countries tend to see more violent 
protests suggesting that as the economy recovers citizens may punish leaders who remain 
under IMF lending. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
194 See Henderson 1993  
195 Moore 1998; Young 2013; Ritter and Conrad 2016 
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Table 1.  Negative Binomial Models   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
D.V. Violent Protest Count 
     
Precautionary loan -0.729**   -0.534 
 (0.332)   (0.337) 
Concessional loan 0.256   0.338 
 (0.205)   (0.235) 
IMF compliance  0.732*  1.164** 
  (0.386)  (0.514) 
IMF years   -0.388* -0.819*** 
   (0.228) (0.295) 
IMF years^2   0.087** 0.141*** 
   (0.039) (0.047) 
IMF years^3   -0.005** -0.007*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Democracy -0.002 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Population (logged) 0.343*** 0.303*** 0.334*** 0.350*** 
 (0.081) (0.077) (0.079) (0.082) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.031 -0.016 -0.017 0.079 
 (0.094) (0.080) (0.081) (0.096) 
Repression 0.058** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Probability of IMF exit 1.707* 1.194 1.883* 1.679* 
 (0.955) (0.953) (1.004) (0.981) 
Non-violent protest 0.020 0.017 0.014 0.018 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Lagged DV 0.127** 0.132** 0.141*** 0.103** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) 
Constant -6.529*** -5.632*** -5.592*** -6.204*** 
 (1.667) (1.444) (1.577) (1.702) 
     
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Alpha 1.86*** 1.86*** 1.83*** 1.69*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Turning to the independent variables of interest, there is weak support for 
hypothesis 1. Concessional loans do not lead to fewer instances of violent protest than 
non-concessional loans in Model 1 or Model 4. This suggests that leaders are either 
avoiding implementing the conditions which protect the poor and social welfare spending 
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or that these conditions, when implemented, are not effective in alleviating grievances 
relative to other types of IMF loans. Precautionary loans are associated with less violence 
in Model 1, but are not statistically different from zero in Model 4. Precautionary loans 
tend to come with fewer conditions. However, once the level of implementation and the 
time under lending are controlled for, these loans do not lead to fewer violent protests. I 
therefore find little support for Hypothesis 1. 
  
 Models 2 and 4 show the effect of IMF compliance on violent protest. In both 
models as IMF compliance increases so do the number of violent protests. These results 
are significant at the 90% level in Model 2 and the 95% level in Model 4 providing 
support for Hypothesis 2. When leaders implement reforms, it generates grievances 
which increases violent protest. In Figure 1 above I plot out-of-sample predictions for 
IMF compliance in Model 4. All of the other regressors are held at their median values, 
and a set of predictions are created at each level of IMF compliance starting at 0% and 
ending at 100%. These predictions are then plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The x-
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axis for this graph represents the different levels of IMF compliance while the y-axis 
shows the predicted number of violent protests.  
 Figure 1 shows that there is a clear positive slope between the predicted number 
of violent protests and the level of compliance. The confidence intervals around these 
predictions are fairly tight at lower levels of compliance.  At higher levels of compliance 
there is greater uncertainty surrounding these predictions because fewer countries 
implement a large percentage of conditions. When countries implement 0% of the 
conditions in an IMF loan they see 0.3 violent protests on average. This number increases 
to 1 violent protest when 100% of conditions are met. On average a country implements 
40% of IMF conditions which translates to an additional 0.2 violent protests in a year 
compared to what they would have seen with no implementation. This number increases 
to an additional 0.7 violent protests if a country were to implement all of the conditions in 
a given year. It is worth noting that the average number of violent protests in the sample 
is 1.  While this may seem a modest increase, it is still substantively significant given 
how rare violent protests are.  
 Finally, Models 3 and 4 explore the effect of time under IMF lending and violent 
protest. This relationship is cubic. Violent protests are decreasing, then increasing, then 
decreasing again. It is important to note that these variables are both individually and 
jointly significant.196 These results provide support for Hypothesis 3. Figure 2 below 
plots the out-of-sample predictions for Model 4. As above, all other regressors are held at 
their median value and predictions are generated for the IMF year variables over their full 
range of values. The graph shows the expected cubic relationship. Protests are largest at 
                                                      
196 Chi-square = 9.83** 
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the start of an IMF program, they decline over the next three years (roughly the amount 
of time of an Extended Fund Facility loan), then violence increases over the next five 
years before declining once again. The confidence intervals are wide, but this is likely a 
function of the small sample size, the use of maximum likelihood, and the short number 
of years. Given these limitations the findings in this graph are more than encouraging and 
show support for hypothesis 3.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 Appendix B includes a number of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. 
These models use many different model specifications including: bootstrapped standard 
errors, fixed-effects, adding a variable for time (year) to account for changes in protest 
patterns over time, non-OECD sample, and a battery of alternative controls. Appendix B 
also includes the logistic regression equation for the probability of IMF exit. The results 
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remain largely unchanged. There is strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 and very little 
support for Hypothesis 1.   
Discussion  
 This paper has broken down IMF austerity into a number of different parts: types 
of loans, time under austerity, and compliance with austerity. The findings suggest that 
higher compliance with IMF agreements causes an increase in violent protest. Further, 
countries see violence at the start of IMF lending and although this violence diminishes in 
subsequent years if governments take out new loans and continue to stay under program 
lending this violence re-emerges. This paper suggests that the policies attached to IMF 
lending promote instability in borrower countries. While there may be additional 
criticisms of IMF program lending this paper shows that the when governments follow 
through on agreements with the IMF they are more likely to see violent protesters in the 
street.   
On September 21st, 2017 United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres 
alongside President Jim Yong Kim of the World Bank Group called for stronger 
international effort to prevent conflict. They argue that while leaders have a role to play 
so do international institutions. International Organizations have to take a careful look at 
their mandate. The results in this paper suggest that the IMF is contributing to conflict in 
governments it lends to. Unless it incorporates human rights protections and ties the 
disbursement of loans to those protections this is unlikely to change. International 
Organizations more broadly should investigate the human rights and conflict 
consequences of their actions. Unless the protection of human rights (including economic 
rights) are built into international agreements conflict likely to continue.  
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The findings here help resolve a critical debate in the IMF literature: why do IMF 
programs have negative outcomes? Critics of the IMF have long pointed to the hardships 
that austerity imposes on citizens. These findings have often been challenged because 
they depend on compliance with conditionality, but compliance is notoriously low. The 
findings here suggest that austerity policies generate more violence even when 
compliance is low. This provides support for critics of the IMF and suggests that while 
adverse selection and political interference may make matters worse, it is the policies 
themselves that generate violence.  
 This paper is just the tip of the iceberg. There are still a large number of questions 
surrounding IMF program lending and conflict that remain unanswered. When do 
protests turn violent is it at the start of a loan, when it is announced? Do we see non-
violent protests emerge and turn violent as a response to leader behavior? Does violence 
spread from other IMF borrowers with individuals building networks to mount more 
effective campaigns of dissent? When leaders respond with repression does dissent 
increase? Are some types of conditions more likely to generate violence than other? What 
role does violence play in bargaining between leaders and the IMF over the specifics of 
conditionality? Does violence lead to early exit from the IMF, leader turnover, or changes 
in compliance?  
 The IMF should worry that program lending generates conflict. Conflict is 
increasingly seen as one of the largest impediments to development and so the IMF is 
undermining its own efforts. Austerity as a recovery package may cause more harm than 
good and the IMF should re-examine other types of reform that cause less hardship on 
populations. The findings here suggest that if leaders implemented all of the conditions 
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they agreed to there would be a surge in violent protest globally. There is plenty of 
evidence that IMF lending was generating violence before. If the IMF truly hopes to 
continue as an organization that promotes economic stability it will have to address this 
shortcoming. Tweaks to austerity are unlikely to be the answer. Instead the IMF should 
turn to human rights led development initiatives if it hopes to promote peace and 
development.    
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Appendix B - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings 
in chapter 2. This is meant to test how sensitive the positive relationship between IMF 
compliance and violent protest is, and see if this relationship disappears when using 
alternative model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail 
test. 
 
These robustness checks are summarized here: 
• 1b. Fixed effects 
• 2b. Random effects 
• 3b. Including a measure of time 
• 4b. Model used to predict the probability of IMF exit 
• 5b. Non-OECD sample 
• 6b. Non-IMF control variables 
• 7b. IMF control variables 
• 8b. Number of conditions as a control variable 
• 9b. Number of conditions as a measure of exposure 
• 10b. Bootstrapped standard errors 
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Appendix table 1b re-estimates the main model from chapter 2 using fixed effects. This 
helps analyze the effect of IMF variables on changes within a country over time. It also 
controls for country specific factors that are not included in the model as control 
variables. The results remain the same. IMF compliance and time under IMF lending 
remain significant.  
Appendix table 1b. Negative binomial regression 
with fixed effects 
Model 1b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.646 
 (0.443) 
Concessional loan -0.316 
 (0.249) 
IMF compliance 1.392** 
 (0.581) 
IMF years -0.488* 
 (0.274) 
IMF years^2 0.087** 
 (0.042) 
IMF years^3 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
Democracy -0.020 
 (0.039) 
Population (logged) 0.074 
 (0.163) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.261 
 (0.172) 
Repression 0.008 
 (0.017) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.074 
 (0.713) 
Non-violent protest -0.001 
 (0.019) 
Lagged DV -0.013 
 (0.035) 
Constant -2.817 
 (3.057) 
  
Observations 429 
Number of countries 62 
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Random Effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix model 2b re-estimates the main model from the paper using random effects. 
The coefficient for precautionary loans is significant and negative in this model. This 
suggests that precautionary loans tend to be associated with fewer instances of violent 
protest. This is evidence in favor of hypothesis 1. IMF compliance and time under IMF 
lending remain significant as in chapter 2. 
Appendix table 2b. Negative binomial regression 
with random effects 
Model 2b 
Violent protest 
  
Precautionary loan -0.681** 
 (0.346) 
Concessional loan -0.167 
 (0.223) 
IMF compliance 1.186** 
 (0.511) 
IMF years -0.473* 
 (0.265) 
IMF years^2 0.088** 
 (0.041) 
IMF years^3 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
Democracy 0.019 
 (0.023) 
Population (logged) 0.328*** 
 (0.087) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.013 
 (0.099) 
Repression 0.030** 
 (0.012) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.310 
 (0.698) 
Non-violent protest 0.005 
 (0.019) 
Lagged DV 0.002 
 (0.034) 
Constant -5.767*** 
 (1.763) 
  
Observations 504 
Number of countries 78 
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Fixed Effects  YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix model 3b included a measure of time (year). It is possible that the variables 
measuring time under IMF lending are simply mirroring changes in violent protests 
trends over time. However, even when controlling time the results are unchanged from 
chapter 2.  
Appendix table 3b. Negative binomial regression.  
Time 
Model 3b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.577 
 (0.445) 
Concessional loan -0.328 
 (0.250) 
IMF compliance 1.476** 
 (0.586) 
IMF years -0.525* 
 (0.278) 
IMF years^2 0.084** 
 (0.042) 
IMF years^3 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
Year 0.076* 
 (0.045) 
Democracy  -0.013 
 (0.039) 
Population (logged) 0.093 
 (0.170) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.110 
 (0.194) 
Repression 0.001 
 (0.017) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.357 
 (0.719) 
Non-violent protest -0.000 
 (0.018) 
Lagged DV -0.026 
 (0.035) 
Constant -153.756* 
 (89.158) 
  
Observations 429 
Number of countries 62 
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Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendix model 4b shows the logistic regression used to generate the probability of IMF 
exit included as a control variable. 
Appendix table 4b. Logistic regression.      
Probability of IMF exit 
Model 4b 
IMF exit 
  
IMF participation (T-1) 1.723** 
 (0.767) 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.006 
 (0.050) 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.013 
 (0.023) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 0.019 
 (0.028) 
Population (logged) 0.322* 
 (0.181) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.252 
 (0.193) 
FDI (% of GDP logged) -0.121 
 (0.181) 
Trade (% of GDP logged) 1.195** 
 (0.555) 
US economic aid 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Democracy 0.089 
 (0.054) 
Number of IMF borrowers -0.284*** 
 (0.098) 
Constant -5.246 
 (5.698) 
Year fixed effects YES 
Observations 462 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix model 5b re-estimates the model from chapter 2 on a sample of non-OECD 
countries. The results remain robust even with this different and smaller sample.  
Appendix table 5b. Negative binomial  
regression. Non-OECD sample 
Model 5b 
Number of violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.700 
 (0.448) 
Concessional loan -0.430 
 (0.264) 
IMF compliance 1.296** 
 (0.573) 
IMF years -0.392 
 (0.290) 
IMF years^2 0.080* 
 (0.044) 
IMF years^3 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
Democracy  -0.019 
 (0.039) 
Population (logged) 0.076 
 (0.159) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.141 
 (0.195) 
Repression 0.014 
 (0.018) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.222 
 (0.763) 
Non-violent protest 0.010 
 (0.021) 
Lagged DV -0.041 
 (0.041) 
Constant -2.228 
 (3.052) 
  
Observations 405 
Number of countries 57 
Fixed Effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix model 6b adds a number of non-IMF control variables. These include: 
Economic liberalization (taken from the Economic Freedom Index); Unemployment 
(from the WDI); independent judiciary (taken from the CIRI dataset); Civil war (taken 
from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset); regular and irregular leader turnover 
(taken from the ARCHIGOS dataset); electoral system (taken from the Political 
Institutions Database); and worker rights (taken from the CIRI database). Economic 
liberalization is used to measure the potential benefits (costs) of IMF program 
participation. Unemployment offers another measure of grievance which might generate 
violence. Independent judiciary is used to measure whether courts can serve as an 
alternative outlet for expressing grievances. Countries under civil war may see fewer 
violent protests (as individuals are rebelling) and undermine the capacity to implement 
IMF reforms. Leader turnover may generate new protests as elections and leadership 
changes are often associated with increases in violence and uncertainty. The electoral 
system has an impact on how domestic preferences are translated into incentives for 
leaders to respond to dissent. Finally, worker rights represent one measure of the 
organizational ability of labor unions which tend to be major opponents of austerity. The 
results with all of these control variables remain unchanged. IMF compliance and time 
under IMF lending remain statistically significant.   
 
Appendix table 6b. Negative binomial regression.  
Non-IMF controls 
Model 6b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.362 
 (0.472) 
Concessional loan -0.382 
 (0.269) 
IMF compliance 1.736*** 
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 (0.634) 
IMF years -0.655** 
 (0.294) 
IMF years^2 0.106** 
 (0.044) 
IMF years^3 -0.005** 
 (0.002) 
Democracy  -0.003 
 (0.044) 
Population (logged) -0.107 
 (0.221) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.065 
 (0.202) 
Repression 0.014 
 (0.017) 
Economic liberalization  0.636** 
 (0.274) 
Unemployment -0.004 
 (0.014) 
Independent judiciary -0.294 
 (0.192) 
Civil war 0.600** 
 (0.237) 
Regular leader turnover 0.052 
 (0.188) 
Irregular turnover -0.403 
 (0.641) 
Assembly elected president 0.369 
 (0.734) 
Presidential system 0.387 
 (0.547) 
Worker rights -0.045 
 (0.239) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.071 
 (0.743) 
Non-violent protest 0.000 
 (0.021) 
Lagged DV -0.021 
 (0.039) 
Constant -2.213 
 (4.506) 
  
Observations 378 
Number of countries 56 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 7b introduces a number of additional IMF controls taken from the SCIP 
dataset. These include the size of the IMF loan, the type of loan, and whether a loan 
ended early in a particular year. The coefficient for precautionary loans is significant in 
this model and negative. This provides support for hypothesis 1. IMF compliance remains 
significant as does the cubic time under IMF lending. However IMF years and IMF 
years^2 lose significance. This is not too surprising as these variables cut the sample size 
and MLE models with small sample sizes bias coefficients towards 0.   
Appendix table 7b. Negative binomial regression.  
IMF controls 
Model 7b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -1.489** 
 (0.665) 
Concessional loan -0.172 
 (0.677) 
IMF compliance 1.504** 
 (0.671) 
IMF years -0.512 
 (0.376) 
IMF years^2 0.087 
 (0.054) 
IMF years^3 -0.004* 
 (0.002) 
IMF loan size (millions of SDRs) 0.096 
 (0.085) 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan -0.698 
 (0.485) 
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan 0.658 
 (1.113) 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan -0.160 
 (0.406) 
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan 1.282 
 (0.801) 
Standby Arrangement (SBA) 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan 2.621** 
 (1.303) 
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Program ended early -0.636 
 (0.401) 
Democracy  0.003 
 (0.049) 
Population (logged) 0.086 
 (0.214) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.360 
 (0.286) 
Repression 0.003 
 (0.018) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.319 
 (0.939) 
Non-violent protest -0.005 
 (0.020) 
Lagged DV -0.014 
 (0.042) 
Constant -3.962 
 (4.456) 
  
Observations 335 
Number of countries 55 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 8 controls for the number of conditions evaluated in a year by the IMF 
Executive Board. This is one measure of the amount of austerity requested. The results 
remain largely the same. IMF compliance and the squared and cubic measures of time 
under IMF lending remain significant. IMF years loses significance. This is not too 
surprising as these variables cut the sample size and MLE models with small sample sizes 
bias coefficients towards 0.   
Appendix table 8b. Negative binomial regression.  
Number of IMF conditions 
Model 8b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.673 
 (0.446) 
Concessional loan -0.335 
 (0.252) 
IMF compliance 1.438** 
 (0.584) 
IMF years -0.446 
 (0.285) 
IMF years^2 0.082* 
 (0.043) 
IMF years^3 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
IMF conditions evaluated -0.001 
 (0.003) 
Democracy -0.021 
 (0.039) 
Population (logged) 0.074 
 (0.163) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.271 
 (0.174) 
Repression 0.008 
 (0.017) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.044 
 (0.718) 
Non-violent protest -0.000 
 (0.019) 
Lagged DV -0.016 
 (0.036) 
Constant -2.912 
 (3.065) 
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Observations 429 
Number of countries 62 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 9b treats the number of conditions as a measure of exposure. The results 
remain unchanged. IMF compliance and time under IMF lending remain significant.  
Appendix table 9b. Negative binomial regression. 
IMF conditions as a measure of exposure 
Model 9b 
Violent protests 
  
Precautionary loan -0.002 
 (0.472) 
Concessional loan -0.246 
 (0.265) 
IMF compliance 1.912*** 
 (0.657) 
IMF years -1.716*** 
 (0.317) 
IMF years^2 0.254*** 
 (0.050) 
IMF years^3 -0.011*** 
 (0.002) 
Democracy -0.051 
 (0.039) 
Population (logged) -0.010 
 (0.161) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.269 
 (0.178) 
Repression -0.024 
 (0.020) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.489 
 (0.748) 
Non-violent protest 0.022 
 (0.020) 
Lagged DV -0.032 
 (0.035) 
Constant -3.145 
 (3.079) 
  
Observations 429 
Number of countries 62 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 10b uses bootstrapped standard errors to account for the imprecise 
measurement of IMF compliance and probability of IMF exit. The results are unchanged. 
Appendix table 10b. 
Bootstrapped standard errors 
Model 1 
Violent protest 
  
Precautionary loan -0.681 
 (0.558) 
Concessional loan -0.167 
 (0.388) 
IMF compliance 1.186* 
 (0.708) 
IMF years -0.473 
 (0.351) 
IMF years^2 0.088 
 (0.055) 
IMF years^3 -0.004 
 (0.003) 
Democracy 0.019 
 (0.035) 
Population (logged) 0.328*** 
 (0.124) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.013 
 (0.170) 
Repression 0.030* 
 (0.016) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.310 
 (1.364) 
Non-violent protest 0.005 
 (0.040) 
Lagged DV 0.002 
 (0.082) 
Constant -5.767** 
 (2.465) 
  
Observations 504 
Number of countries 78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 3:  Compliance with IMF Austerity and Repression 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have played a major role in economic 
reform since the 1970s. They control considerable resources and use those resources to 
shape the economic policies of loan recipients. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
makes the disbursement of loans conditional on the implementation of austerity reforms: 
significant cuts to government spending and the promotion of neoliberal economic 
reforms. Reforms are meant to correct economic problems and promote growth. Despite 
these goals most previous studies conclude that, other things equal, participation in IMF 
programs causes dissatisfaction among the citizens, who then resist reforms efforts. 
Faced with such resistance, governments often respond by increasing human rights 
violations.    
 Critics of this research program and these research findings often note that 
“participation” in an IMF program is not the same as “compliance” with IMF loan 
conditions. Few previous studies have measured the degree of compliance with IMF loan 
conditions, and no previous large-scale comparative study has examined the relationship 
between degree of compliance with loan conditions and the degree of repression of 
human rights by the loan recipient country.  
 This paper explores the relationship between compliance with IMF conditionality 
and physical integrity rights between 2002 and 2014. Physical integrity rights refer to the 
rights of a country’s population to be free from the state use of torture, disappearances, 
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extra judicial killings, and political imprisonment. The violation of physical integrity 
rights is called repression, though repression may also take other forms. Previous 
research has found IFIs have a detrimental effect on physical integrity rights.197 However, 
these studies have failed to account for compliance with conditionality. Whether or not 
reforms are ever implemented has often been assumed away due to data limitations. 
Critics of this literature point to low compliance as a source of poor outcomes such as 
increased repression. Given that IMF borrowers implement fewer than half of the reforms 
they agree to this critique is an important one.  Compliance is an integral part to any story 
about how IMF austerity policies affect human rights but is missing from empirical 
research. 
 This study advances the literature in two ways. First, this is the first paper to 
systematically evaluate how compliance with IMF conditionality affects repression. The 
literature on IMF compliance notes that compliance is notoriously low.198 If countries are 
not implementing reforms, then reforms may not be the source of repression. Thus, 
without taking compliance into consideration it is difficult to accept the results of past 
research tying IMF austerity to repression. Second, this paper tests whether this 
relationship holds in the 21st century. Past work has primarily focused on the late 20th 
century. The IMF has made significant reforms in the 21st century in response to criticism 
from scholars and policy makers about the negative consequences of program lending. 
The effects of IMF lending in the 21st century may be markedly different from lending in 
the 20th century if these reforms were successful. This paper uses a new measure on IMF 
                                                      
197 Pion-Berlin 1984; Keith and Poe 2000; Abouharb & Cingranelli 2006, 2007, 2009; Hill and Jones 2014 
198 See Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009 
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compliance over the period 2002-2014 to test this relationship. Empirical results show 
that higher compliance with IMF conditionality leads to greater repression. These 
findings suggest that it is austerity policies promoted by the IMF which create conditions 
conducive to increased repression. 
Causes of Repression 
Governments repress in order to control dissent.199 This paper is concerned with 
physical integrity rights violations as a form of repression though this is certainly not the 
only form that repression can take. This section outlines some of the research on the 
determinants of repression. Scholarly literature suggests that government use of 
repression is a function of threat, institutions, and state capacity. The choice of repressive 
tactics and the actor responsible for repression also vary depending on the threat and goal 
that repression is meant to accomplish.  
Whether a country is democratic or not provides one explanation for whether 
countries repress their citizens. During the Arab Spring in the Middle East Hosni 
Mubarak (Egypt) and Ben Ali (Tunisia) and other autocratic leaders used deadly force 
against peaceful protesters calling for political and economic reform. Although 
autocracies repress at higher levels than democracies, repression in response to threat 
occurs in democracies as well. The repression of the Occupy Wall Street protesters in the 
United States or peaceful Greek anti-austerity protesters is consistent with work showing 
that repression occurs in response to threat even if a country is democratic.200  
                                                      
199 See Davenport 1995, 2007; Moore 2000; Carey 2010; Bell, Cingranelli, Murdie, and Caglayan 2013 
200 Conrad and Moore 2010; Danneman and Ritter 2014 
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Democracies have institutions which make repression less likely. Elections 
provide an alternative means of expressing dissatisfaction with government policy.201 
Rather than dissenting, individuals can vote a leader out of office and choose another 
leader who promises to address grievances. Rule of law which constrains leaders allows 
citizens to hold the government and its agents accountable for violations of the law. 
Opposition parties provide an additional voice which may take up the issues that citizens 
have with their leader and provide them a voice. These institutions make repression less 
likely, but when governments are threated they repress, democracy or not.202 Although 
democracies are less likely to repress they also provide freedom of association which 
may allow citizens to co-ordinate anti-government activities leading to more threats and 
more dissent.203  
Although threat increases the probability that governments repress their citizens 
the form repression takes can vary significantly. Some governments opt to shut down the 
press and access to information critical of the government. In these cases, the government 
may target journalists either through intimidation, physical harm, or by killing those who 
speak critically of political leaders.204 The government in Egypt during the Arab Spring 
for example shut down social media sites like Twitter and Facebook and the Tunisian 
government hacked citizens Facebook accounts and censored web content. Repression 
may be overt such as killing opponents or arresting opposition figures. It may also be 
                                                      
201 Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Anderson and Mendes 2006; Cingranelli and Filippov 2010 
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covert as leaders “disappear” those who criticize them and subject dissidents to torture. In 
Argentina during the dirty war of the 1970s and early 1980s the military abducted over 
30,000 individuals many of which were killed and tortured. Leaders may repress pre-
emptively if the anticipate that citizens are going to engage in some form of dissent. If 
leaders expect conflict to spillover from neighboring states or are about to take action 
which lead to dissent in the past or in other contexts repression may increase.205 Leaders 
also repress preventively in an attempt to increase the costs of dissent.206 This may take 
the form of expelling journalists or arresting leaders of groups opposed to the 
government. The idea here is to weaken the oppositions ability to mobilize and challenge 
the government. 
Leaders are often credited with the decision to repress. When they are threatened 
they tell state agents to repress the opposition, ethnic groups, labor organizers, protesters 
or whoever they see as a threat. Alternatively, repression can also occur when leaders 
lose control over their agents.207 Agents who are underpaid may use repression as a 
means to supplement their income. The police and military may also sell their allegiance 
to elites, businesses, and criminal organizations: for example, police in Mexico who are 
in the pocket of drug cartels. Training in human rights and conflict de-escalation may 
also help avoid situations which lead to repression.208 Repression is not always 
purposeful but may be an emotional reaction by state agents to provocation from 
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dissidents or perceived threats.209 Repression may also be the result of psychological 
biases among state agents who hold biased attitudes towards certain racial, ethnic, 
political, or gender groups.210  
The most significant predictor of repression however remains threats to a leader’s 
power. Political violence,211 civil war,212 and political protest all represent threats and as 
such have been found to increase repression. 213 Weak states in particular are often unable 
to project their power and as such are more likely to see citizens engage in collective 
violence.214 As threat increases we are more likely to see violence, but this increase is 
filtered through domestic institutions and the capacity of the state.  
IMF programs create conditions which make repression more likely for several of 
the reasons outlined above. States are weaker under IMF lending as the economy is in 
crisis and leaders have fewer resources available to address dissent besides repression. 
State agents are disgruntled, underpaid, and act with less oversight increasing agency 
loss. Threats to leader power come from both below (citizens) and above (elites). These 
mechanisms work to increase the likelihood that IMF borrowers repress their citizens. 
The next section outlines this process in more detail.  
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Theory 
 This paper explores how compliance with IMF lending might generate repression. 
IMF reforms are unpopular and when governments enact them they face a variety of 
threats to their power. Repression occurs in response to this threat. Compliance is 
understudied in the IMF and human rights literature in part because there is very little 
data measuring it, and the data that does exist is quite blunt.215 The literature on 
compliance is unanimous that most countries implement less than half of the conditions 
attached to IMF loans.216 This has made a number of scholars question the findings 
between IMF lending and repression. If leaders are not enacting reforms then reforms 
cannot be responsible for an increase in repression. Other aspects of IMF lending might 
increase repression such as the unpopular nature of the IMF as an institution or the 
weakness that leaders convey when taking out a loan.217 In order for austerity reforms to 
cause repression they must actually be implemented. Taking a look at how compliance 
affects repression and testing whether repression is a function of increased compliance is 
a necessary step for the IMF human rights literature to move forward.  
 Economic crises are a stress factor that makes repression more likely. Whether a 
country reforms or not, economic crisis makes a government look weak and incompetent. 
Was this crisis the fault of the government? If citizens blame their government for 
causing or failing to respond appropriately to an economic crisis then they may seek to 
                                                      
215 See Vreeland 2006 
216 Vreeland 2002, 2006; Dreher 2006, 2009; Stone 2004, 2008, 2011; Bas and Stone 2014 
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replace them.218 Taking out a loan with the IMF makes leaders look incompetent.219 
Unable to address economic problems themselves, they must turn to an international 
lender for help. While leaders do try and use the IMF as a scapegoat turning to the IMF 
looks bad for leaders trying to convey competency. 220 This explains why leaders who 
take out IMF loans are often replaced.221 The decision to turn to the IMF comes with 
significant risk to leader tenure. This risk is known, and most leaders avoid turning to the 
IMF if they have other options.  
The IMF is a lender of last resort which bails out bankrupt (or nearly bankrupt) 
states. They provide access to money in exchange for economic reforms. This money can 
prevent bankruptcy in the short term and prevent leaders from defaulting on their 
international and domestic debts. Signing onto an IMF loan can help leaders credibly 
commit to pro-market reforms in the future which can generate investment and trade.222 
Borrowing from the IMF represents a public commitment to pro-market reforms and 
there are significant costs to breaking this commitment.223 This commitment is often seen 
as credible since leaders are willing to take on significant domestic costs by signing up 
for an IMF program and enacting the prior actions necessary to be approved for a loan. 
IMF austerity as a reform strategy hinges on pro-market reforms which shifts power 
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away from the state and towards market actors.224 It is popular with businesses and some 
elites but unpopular with much of the citizenry who pay the costs of these reforms. 
Turning to the IMF then is a choice to promote economic recovery by focusing on trade, 
foreign investment, and business development. It is not the only economic recovery 
strategy and it comes with significant costs like any reform strategy. 
IMF austerity places the burden of reform on citizens and in particular the poor 
and workers.225 While leaders bargain with the IMF to minimize the conditions they 
anticipate will be the most unpopular the conditionality attached to IMF lending asks 
leaders for more reforms and at a more rapid pace than would have happened under 
normal policy making. 226, 227 The literature tying IMF reforms to hardships on borrower 
populations is massive and quite unanimous that IMF conditionality leads to significant 
violations of economic and social rights.228 Citizens bare the cost of reform and these 
costs are largest for the poor, women, workers, and vulnerable populations. Austerity 
reforms include cuts to public employment, wages, and benefits; social welfare cuts; and 
dismantling of labor protections. Budget cuts tend to negatively impact monitoring 
agencies tasked with finding and punishing human rights violators. As governments 
comply with more of the reforms tasked them by the IMF citizens feel a larger and larger 
burden. This burden leads to significant grievances among the population which 
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generates collective dissent.229 Austerity increases repression through its effect on state 
agents, collective dissent, and limiting the policy tools available to leaders. 
Cuts to police and military budgets often result in decreased employment, wages, 
and benefits. This predictably causes grievances among these state agents. These agents 
may turn to repression as a way to supplement their income.230 Alternatively, disgruntled 
state agents tasked with containing social unrest may be more likely to respond 
emotionally with violence rather than purposefully following order.231 Fewer state agents 
as a result of layoffs or strikes increases the burden on remaining state agents. State 
agents tasked with containing dissent with fewer resources and less manpower can make 
repressive tactics more likely. State agents are also more likely to encounter collective 
dissidents and repression may increase simply as a function of the increased number of 
opportunities to repress. 
Citizens who are unhappy at being asked to foot the bill for economic reform 
often engage in collective dissent in an attempt to halt or reverse such reforms. 
Protests,232 riots,233 and rebellion increase under IMF lending. 234 Elites may challenge 
leaders who are weak by instigating dissent or directly attempting to overthrow leaders. 
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235, 236 Elites who gained rents and exercised power of economic policy under the status 
quo may fight reforms which threaten those rents.237 Leaders under IMF lending face 
significant threats from both above and below. These threats are exacerbated by greater 
compliance with reforms which produces more grievances, dissent, and change from the 
status quo. As the size of these threats increases the use of repression becomes more 
likely.  
In order to comply with IMF austerity leaders significantly cut their budgets. This 
leaves them with fewer tools to quell dissent. IMF reforms in the 21st century bleed into 
all aspects of governance including data collection, bureaucratic structure, and legal 
institutions.238 Leaders are double constrained by the amount of reforms they are tasked 
with implementing and the need to cut government spending while doing so. Enacting 
reforms significantly tasks state capacity as leaders must use significant political capital 
to comply with reforms lest they lose funding. Spending is one tool that leaders 
traditionally use to quell dissent and buy support, but during IMF lending this tool is for 
all intense and purpose taken off the table.239  Repression under IMF lending is a cheap 
tool that can be employed in response to threats. The mechanisms discussed above lead to 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: As compliance with IMF conditionality increases, 
government respect for physical integrity rights decreases  
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Compliance or Non-Compliance? 
 The mechanisms outlined above require the implementation of reforms to operate. 
All of these mechanisms translate policy reform into consequences which threaten leader 
survival and provoke repression. If leaders are not implementing reforms then they 
should feel less threatened (though they may still face some threat due to economic 
trouble). This also suggests that high compliance borrowers should be more repressive 
than low compliance borrowers. Past research has tended to focus on the relationship 
between IMF borrowers and non-IMF borrowers.  
Some of the mechanisms tying IMF lending to repression are theorized to operate 
with or without compliance. When leaders sign up for an IMF program is can signal 
incompetence.240 Unable to address economic crisis leaders have to ask for help from an 
International Organization that dictates domestic economic policy. This leads to a loss of 
economic sovereignty which elites who stand to lose power and citizens who dislike 
international interference in domestic politics often dislike.241 Signing up for an IMF 
program can also be seen as “selling out” to the West or as a new form imperialism 
which can be particularly unpopular in some post-colonial countries.242  
Compliance theories such as the one outlined above differ in that they suggest that 
repression increases only when governments implement reforms. Do the conditions that 
the IMF recommends create conditions that increase repression when enacted? By 
comparing IMF borrowers, it is possible to distinguish whether repression is the result of 
                                                      
240 See Dreher 2003, 2004 
241 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Ortiz and Bejar 2013 
242 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007 
159 
 
compliance mechanisms or non-compliance mechanisms. Once this distinction is made 
there are reasons to be skeptical about whether compliance generates repression in the 
21st century.  
 Most countries implement very few of the conditions attached to IMF loans. 
While systematic data on compliance with conditionality is rare, scholars generally agree 
that less than half of conditions are met on average.243 This paper presents a new measure 
of IMF compliance which finds that only 39% of conditions evaluated by the IMF 
Executive Board in a year are met by borrower governments between 2002 and 2015. 
Low compliance has been argued to be the result of moral hazard, dependence, and 
adverse selection.244 Poor IMF outcomes are also the result of political interference from 
member countries which help their allies to avoid the costs of austerity. The United States 
for example has been shown to intervene in lending decisions and countries can 
sometimes trade political favors for less stringent conditionality. 245, 246 It is possible that 
poor outcomes associated with IMF lending are the result of non-compliance. Rather than 
the threat-repression linkage outlined above it may be that repressive countries are more 
likely to sign up for an IMF loan, not reform and repress their citizens at higher levels 
than non-IMF borrowers.  
It is also possible that poor outcomes are a thing of the past. The IMF has made 
significant reforms to its lending process by streamlining conditionality, adding 
                                                      
243 See Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009 
244 See Dreher 2009; Stone 2011; Bas and Stone 2014 
245 See Stone 2004, 2008, 2011 
246 Dreher et al. 2015 
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conditions to protect the poor, adding social welfare floors, and removing the aspects of 
conditionality that have been criticized the most.247 For example, structural performance 
criteria (often criticized by human rights scholars) have been discontinued since 2009.248 
Although the IMF has not embraced the language of human rights, pro-poor policies can 
be seen as an attempt to mitigate the social consequences of lending. These reforms have 
accompanied public statements that IMF lending today is completely different than 
lending in the past.249 Even if past IMF agreements did create conditions that were 
conducive to repression, things in the 21st century may be quite different. This is 
especially true in the last decade. 
The 2007 global crisis posed a serious threat to the international economic order. 
The post 2007 era presents the best test of the argument above for several reasons. First, 
the severity of the global crisis created a situation where IMF member countries were less 
likely to interfere politically with lending decisions. Previous research has found that 
political interference is minimal when the severity of crises is large.250  This allowed the 
IMF to focus on promoting a stable economic system with less worry about upsetting 
member countries. Second, funding for the IMF was tripled in 2009 by the G20 
countries.251 The IMF was able to give out significantly more in funds and fund more 
countries as a result. This is reflected in the large number of IMF borrowers after the 
                                                      
247 IEO 2007, IMF 2009 
248 IMF 2009 
249 See Kentilikenis et al. 2016 
250 Stone 2008, 2011 
251 IMF 2009a 
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crisis (reaching 61 countries in 2010 compared with just 24 in 2002). Loans given out in 
the last ten years consist of streamlined conditionality. Publicly the IMF declared that 
these loans were designed to mitigate much of the harm that past lending had caused.252 If 
true then IMF lending today may indeed be very different than lending in the pat. The 
post 2007 period provides the most stringent test of the theory above. This paper splits 
the sample into three categories: 2002-2014, 2002-2008, and 2008-2014. I expect that 
compliance will have a negative relationship with respect for physical integrity rights 
regardless of the time period looked at. If IMF reforms were successful, this relationship 
should disappear in the 2008-2014 period. Given the small sample size this test is biased 
against finding a statistically significant relationship in either direction. 
Research Design 
This study uses cross-sectional time series data measured at the country-year 
level. The sample is made up of 74 IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. This 
represents the full sample of IMF borrowers (93 countries) minus those whose data does 
not exist for the control variables. This sample allows for the most direct test of how 
compliance affects repression. Issues of non-random selection into IMF programs are 
described as a significant empirical impediment in the literature.253 By directly comparing 
all IMF borrowers the issue of selection is held constant.254 This significantly simplifies 
the challenges to empirical evaluation but at the same time limits the sample size to under 
                                                      
252 See Kentkelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016 
253 See Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Bas and Stone 2014 
254 See for example Oatley 2004; Dreher et al. 2015 
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500. This has the potential of downwardly biasing estimates and creating type II errors 
(false negatives).255  
Least squares estimators are well suited to address small sample sizes.256 This 
paper uses a generalized least squares regression model with panel corrected standard 
errors (PCSE).257 PCSE models are appropriate when the number of units (countries) is 
much larger than the number of time periods. The model assumes first order correlation 
within panels and uses a first order autoregressive process to control for this.258 Fixed 
effects are added to better estimate changes within panels over time. These models also 
assume errors are heteroskedastic across panels and contemporaneously correlated. 
Finally, I lag all control variables 1 year to minimize the potential for reverse causality. 
The second challenge to evaluating the effect of IMF conditionality on outcomes 
of interest is the lack of data on compliance. This paper uses a novel measure of IMF 
compliance taken from the State-level Compliance with IMF Programs dataset (SCIP). 
This dataset codes over 34,000 IMF Executive Board evaluations between 2002 and 2014 
for 94 IMF borrowers. Compliance is coded as the percentage of IMF conditions that the 
IMF Executive Board evaluated as met in a given year divided by the total number of 
conditions evaluated.  
                                                      
255 Gericke and Crippin 2017 
256 The results are largely the same with the use of an ordered logistic regression model or partial 
proportional odds models. These models can be found in the appendix 
257 Beck and Katz 1995, 2004; Mosley and Uno 2007 
258 The use of a lagged dependent variable produces similar results and can be found in the appendix. I opt 
to use an AR1 process as scholars have noted that lagged dependent variables eat up significant variance in 
the data and can introduce additional estimation issues (see Achen 2000). 
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The dependent variable is taken from the CIRI human rights database and recently 
updated by the CI-Rights dataset. The Physical Integrity Rights index is a discrete 
variable coded from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating greater respect (less repression). 
This is an additive index consisting of four ordinal measures of repression: political 
imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. The index is coded out 
of the U.S. State Department reports on Human Rights and Amnesty International 
Reports. Each of these four measures if coded from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating 
greater respect for each variable. This is a common indicator used to measure repression 
in the human rights literature and past researchers have treated it as continuous.259 
The literature on IMF program participation and repression informs the control 
variables in the model which might affect both compliance and repression. Past research 
has argued that the larger the population of a country the more repression we are likely to 
see.260 The model includes a logged measure of country population. State capacity has the 
potential to increase compliance and repressive capability. I use logged GDP per capita as 
a proxy for state capacity.261 GDP per capita is a good measure of bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity (which might affect compliance) and also captures economic 
grievances which might also increase repression.262 Both of these measures are taken 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. Regime type has 
                                                      
259 See Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009 
260 See Henderson 1993 
261 See Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hendrix 2013 
262 See Hendrix 2010 for an overview of state capacity measures and a discussion of GDP per capita. 
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been shown to affect compliance as well as repression. 263, 264 Democracies tend to 
repress less than autocratic states. I use the democracy scale (polity2) taken from the 
PolityIV dataset coded from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more democratic 
state. Intra-state conflict has also been tied to an increase in the use of repression and may 
limit the ability (or willingness) of states to implement IMF reforms.265 The model 
includes a dichotomous measure of civil conflict coded as 1 if there is any conflict 
between the government and a domestic group that leads to at least 25 battle deaths in a 
year. This measure is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.  
Finally, I include a measure of the probability a country stays under an IMF 
program. This issue was outlined by Przeworski and Vreeland (1999) in their work 
exploring IMF programs and growth. They argue that the decision to stay under an IMF 
program is not random but strategic and one that should be modelled. Researchers have 
since focus much more on their discussion of non-random selection into IMF lending 
though the decision to leave is especially important for samples consisting of only IMF 
lenders. Leaders may choose to exit an IMF program early rather than repress their 
citizens or comply with IMF conditions. The ability to exit is therefore an alternative 
policy option that most past work has ignored. Building on past work I explore the 
decision to remain under IMF lending or exit early.266  
                                                      
263 See Oatley 2004, Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009 
264 Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport 2004 
265 Kalyvas 2006 
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I build a logistic regression model predicting early exit from IMF lending. Early 
exit is taken from the SCIP dataset (see above) and coded as 1 if an IMF arrangement 
ended earlier than its original or revised end date. Using logistic regression, I predict 
early exit for IMF borrowers as a function of whether a country was under an IMF 
program the previous year, a variety of economic indicators (GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, current account balance, inflation, FDI, trade), political indicators (US economic 
aid, regime type, the number of IMF borrowers, labor rights) and a dummy variable for 
each year to capture exogenous shocks such as the global crisis and changes in IMF 
funding by member states. The results of this model can be found in the appendix. I add 
the predictions from the early exit model as a control in the repression model. 
Results 
Table 1 (below) shows the results of three models predicting physical integrity 
rights as a function of compliance with IMF conditionality. Model 1 estimates this 
relationship for the full sample of IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. Model 2 
explores the 2002-2007 time-period and Model 3 explores the 2008-2014 era when the 
world was engulfed in a global economic crisis. The results of the three models are 
largely the same. The inclusion of fixed effects dilutes many of the control variables267 
which are largely insignificant with the exception of Model 2. In Model 2 democracies 
and wealthier countries tend to have better respect for physical integrity rights which is 
consistent with past work.  
 In every model compliance with IMF conditionality is statistically significant and 
in the predicted direction. As countries implement a larger percentage of conditions, 
                                                      
267 Beck 2001 
166 
 
respect for physical integrity rights declines. This effect is substantively quite large. If a 
country implemented 100% of the conditions they were tasked with then respect for 
physical integrity rights would decline by between 0.57 and 0.7 in a given year. The 
largest effect is predicted in the post-2007 era when IMF lending was streamlined and 
well-funded despite the smaller sample size. This is further evidence the IMF 
conditionality is responsible for repression rather than other factors. These results are 
consistent with the causal argument in the paper and provide support for Hypothesis 1.  
Table 1. OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors  
Physical Integrity Rights Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    2002-2014 2002-2007 2008-2014 
    
Percent of IMF conditions met -0.649*** -0.576* -0.699*** 
 (0.195) (0.345) (0.232) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.766 1.607 0.751 
 (0.638) (1.061) (0.711) 
Population (logged) 0.140 -1.270 -0.649 
 (0.693) (1.827) (1.472) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.137 0.496* 0.782 
 (0.185) (0.290) (0.509) 
Democracy 0.061 0.165*** -0.013 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.037) 
Civil conflict 0.036 0.205 0.034 
 (0.164) (0.212) (0.239) 
Constant 4.109 21.631 11.102 
 (10.328) (28.407) (21.869) 
    
Fixed effects YES YES YES 
AR1 process w/in panels YES YES YES 
Observations 429 194 235 
R-squared 0.927 0.952 0.968 
Number of countries 74 53 62 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-tail test. 
 
 About 80% of countries either show no change in physical integrity rights in a 
given year or a one-unit change (either positive or negative). The average level of 
compliance is around 40% which translates into a decrease of between .23 and .28 within 
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a single year. If a country stays under an IMF program for four years (35% of countries 
remain under IMF lending for 4 years or more) this translates into about a one unit 
decrease in respect for physical integrity rights. This shows strong support for Hypothesis 
1 which are substantively meaningful.  
 Figure 1 below shows out-of-sample predictions for Model 1. All of the control 
variables in the model are set to their median value.268 I then set the fixed effect for 
country equal to a country which is very similar to these values. In this case Benin fits 
with these median values and is representative of the data in the dataset.269 I then generate 
a prediction at each levels of compliance with conditionality beginning at 0% and 
increasing to 100% by one-unit increments. This data does not exist within the sample 
(hence the out-of-sample description) but is representative of the data as a whole. I 
include 95% confidence intervals around these predictions.  
                                                      
268 Democracy is set at 7, logged population is set at 16.07, logged gdp is set at 7.03, civil conflict is set to 
0, and the probability of exit is set to 0.06. 
269 Benin went under IMF lending in 2005 and remained under for 10 years. Over the same time period 
overall respect for physical integrity rights has declined. 
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 Figure 1 shows that as the percentage of IMF conditions implemented (x-axis) 
increases the predicted level of respect for physical integrity rights (y-axis) decreases. 
Moving from implementing 0% of conditions to 100% of conditions in a single year leads 
to a decline of physical integrity rights in the order of 0.65 for a single year. The 95% 
confidence intervals surrounding these predictions do not overlap indicating that these 
results are fairly strong. This graph shows a clear negative relationship between 
compliance with IMF conditionality and respect for physical integrity rights.  
Robustness Checks 
 A number of alternative model specifications were used to check how robust the 
findings above are. These can be found in Appendix 3 and include: a partial proportional 
odds model that treats the DV used above as ordered; the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable, using the change in physical integrity rights rather than the level; using a non-
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OECD sample; the inclusion of additional non-IMF controls such as leader turnover, 
unemployment, judicial independence and freedom of speech; additional IMF controls 
such as loan size, time under lending, and loan type; a negative binomial regression 
model with repression measured as the number of repressive acts against protesters (a 
new dependent variable); repression of protests controlling for whether there were any 
protests to repress; a mediation model predicting violent protest with IMF compliance 
and then using violent protest and compliance to predict repression. All of these models 
support the argument and hypothesis made above. A number of models were also run 
predicting the underlying components of the physical integrity rights and changes in these 
underlying components. The results show that IMF compliance increases the use of 
political imprisonment and disappearances as well as causing a positive change in the use 
of extra-judicial killings. This once again supports the arguments made above though it 
does suggest that IMF compliance may increase some types of repression more than 
others. There is no evidence that IMF compliance however reduces the use of repression 
regardless of how repression is measured here.  
Conclusion 
This paper argues, and the empirical results show that higher compliance with 
IMF conditionality was associated with increased repression by governments. These 
findings hold in the 21st century despite reforms that the IMF has made to its lending 
practices. These results are strongest in the 2008-2014 period when the IMF had the 
greatest funding and support for its mission. This paper speaks to the debate about 
whether negative IMF outcomes are the result of adverse selection, dependency, or the 
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wrong policies. The findings here show that in the case of repression compliance with the 
policies that the IMF recommends are responsible for greater repression.  
   These findings also lend support to empirical work that has criticized the IMF 
but have been unable to measure of test whether policies were being enacted. This 
literature is large and ties IMF program participation to declines in labor rights, health 
and education, respect for women’s economic rights, and respect for economic rights. 
IMF programs are also tied to increased conflict such as protests, riots, and rebellion. 
Low compliance has often been pointed to as a reason to be skeptical of these findings. 
Low compliance among IMF borrowers is well documented. However, the results here 
suggest that even low levels of compliance can generate increased repression. Future 
work should re-evaluate the literature in light of new compliance data. If these results 
hold despite controlling for compliance or as they do here as a function of compliance 
this helps resolve the ongoing debate about why IMF programs have been largely seen as 
a failure. While adverse selection and political interference may still occur, austerity 
implementation still causes repression. These results also imply that if governments were 
to comply more we would see a rise in global repression. 
Despite the findings here there are still many questions left unanswered. Future 
work may look at whether other kinds of repression also increase such as preventive 
repression or pre-emptive repression. Preventive repression – such as curfews, limits on 
assembly, restrictions on the press – is often used to undermine mobilization.270 Pre-
emptive repression occurs when governments repress in the anticipation of dissent. Given 
that IMF lending is tied to dissent it would not be surprising to find that leaders engage in 
                                                      
270 Ritter and Conrad 2016 
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both preventive and pre-emptive repression when taking out a IMF loan, especially if 
their neighbors under IMF programs are facing widespread dissent. Do these findings 
hold in democratic countries or just non-democratic ones? Although democracies have 
institutional constraints built in to prevent repression and channel dissent to other 
avenues, the mechanisms outlined in this paper should apply as much to democratic 
countries as the do to non-democratic ones.  
More generally these findings provide further evidence that International 
Organizations such as the IMF can have a large and negative impact on the human rights 
conditions of governments. International agreements often call for significant changes to 
domestic policy. These changes can have unintended consequences (such as increasing 
repression and dissent) that undermine their mission. Both repression and conflict are 
obstacles to development. If the IMF and other International Organizations seek to 
promote development, then they must incorporate the protection of human rights into 
their mandates. They must further tie this protection to the disbursement of benefits and 
dolling out of punishment. Where states violate human rights in order to accommodate 
international agreements these agreements cannot pretend to adhere to human rights law.  
The IMF should be concerned that its lending programs generate repression. 
Funder governments should also be concerned that efforts to promote economic recovery 
may spark repression and conflict which have the opposite effect. Future work would 
benefit from expanding compliance data to the 1990s. It is possible that the reforms that 
IMF have made have mitigated some of the negative consequences of austerity. This 
would be good news for the IMF if true. However, program lending continues to 
undermine human rights respect in the 21st century. These reforms are clearly not enough 
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to address what scholars and borrower governments have been saying for decades. There 
is plenty of evidence that this has been occurring for decades and this suggests that the 
IMF is either unwilling or does not care to protect human rights.  
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Appendix C - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings 
in chapter 3. This is meant to test how sensitive the negative relationship between IMF 
compliance and repress is, and see if this relationship disappears when using alternative 
model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail test. 
 
These robustness checks are summarized here: 
• 1c. Lagged dependent variable 
• 2c. Change in repression as the dependent variable 
• 3c. Non-OECD sample 
• 4c. Repression of protesters as an alternative dependent variable 
• 5c. Repression of protesters controlling for selection 
• 6c. Non-IMF control variables 
• 7c. IMF control variables 
• 8c. Mediation model  
• 9c. Disaggregating the Physical Integrity Index 
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Appendix table 1c re-estimates the models from the paper and includes a lagged 
dependent variable. Model 1c and 3c remain unchanged. However, model 2c loses 
significance. This may be due to the low sample size (197 cases). Overall the findings 
support the hypothesis made in chapter 3.  
 
Appendix table 1c. OLS with PCSE predicting 
physical integrity rights. Lagged DV 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c 
2002-2014 2002-2007 2008-2014 
    
Lagged DV 0.218*** 0.037 0.126 
 (0.060) (0.081) (0.091) 
Probability of IMF exit 1.009 1.396 1.633** 
 (0.643) (1.084) (0.804) 
IMF compliance -0.467** -0.320 -0.727*** 
 (0.216) (0.314) (0.277) 
Population (logged) 0.449 -1.195 0.559 
 (0.821) (2.244) (1.545) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.299 0.414 0.289 
 (0.189) (0.335) (0.560) 
Democracy 0.069 0.259*** -0.064 
 (0.067) (0.077) (0.080) 
Civil war 0.049 0.212 0.194 
 (0.175) (0.257) (0.292) 
Constant -1.321 19.959 -5.335 
 (12.427) (34.958) (22.921) 
    
Observations 450 197 253 
R-squared 0.817 0.854 0.856 
Number of countries 78 53 66 
Fixed effects YES YES YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 2c changes the dependent variable to change in physical integrity rights. 
IMF compliance remains significant once again showing support for hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Appendix table 2c. OLS with PCSE Model 4c 
Change in repression Change in physical integrity rights 
  
IMF compliance -0.427* 
 (0.234) 
Probability of IMF exit -1.016 
 (0.632) 
Population (logged) -0.182 
 (0.844) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.213 
 (0.174) 
Democracy 0.049 
 (0.035) 
Civil war -0.103 
 (0.203) 
Physical integrity rights 0.694*** 
 (0.056) 
Constant -1.466 
 (12.898) 
  
Observations 491 
Number of countries 79 
R-squared 0.383 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 3c looks at the sample of non-OECD countries. IMF compliance remains 
significant once again showing support for hypothesis 1.  
 
Appendix table 3c. OLS with PCSE Model 5c 
Non-OECD sample Physical integrity 
rights 
  
IMF compliance -0.749*** 
 (0.191) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.949 
 (0.667) 
Population (logged) -0.017 
 (0.691) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.152 
 (0.180) 
Democracy 0.061 
 (0.040) 
Civil war 0.014 
 (0.163) 
Constant 6.784 
 (10.329) 
  
Observations 437 
Number of countries 73 
R-squared 0.925 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 4c uses an alternative measure of repression. This is the number of 
repressive acts (crowd dispersal, arrests, beatings, killings, and shootings) used against 
protesters in a year. A single protest can include multiple acts of repression and indicates 
more aggressive repression. Data on protest repression is taken from the Mass 
Mobilization protest database. 
 
Appendix table 4c. Negative binomial regression Model 6c 
Alternative dependent variable Protest 
repression 
  
Lagged DV 0.012 
 (0.009) 
IMF compliance 0.722* 
 (0.387) 
Probability of IMF exit 0.440 
 (0.618) 
Total number of protests 0.055*** 
 (0.004) 
Population (logged) 0.216*** 
 (0.084) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.124 
 (0.085) 
Democracy  -0.010 
 (0.022) 
Civil war 0.298 
 (0.206) 
Constant -3.742** 
 (1.538) 
  
Observations 414 
Number of countries 77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 5c estimates the same model as appendix model 6c while also accounting 
that repression of protesters is censored. Repression of protesters cannot occur unless 
there is a protest to repress. One third of years in the IMF only sample have no protests. 
This may introduce selection problems. Model 7c predicts whether there is a protest in a 
year. The probability of protest is then included as a control variable in model 8c 
predicting protest repression. 
 
Appendix table 5c. Protest  
repression controlling for  
selection 
Model 7c Model 8c 
Logistic regression Negative binomial regression 
Protest onset Protest repression 
   
Non-violent protest 0.314***  
 (0.039)  
Violent protest 0.339***  
 (0.076)  
Youth male unemployment 0.011*  
 (0.006)  
Political system = 1 0.010  
 (0.235)  
Political system = 2 -0.490***  
 (0.160)  
Democracy 0.072*** -0.039* 
 (0.013) (0.023) 
Regular leader turnover -0.302**  
 (0.146)  
Irregular leader turnover -0.190  
 (0.485)  
Physical integrity rights index -0.082*  
 (0.047)  
Probability of IMF exit 0.039 2.446* 
 (1.207) (1.265) 
Population (logged) 0.228*** 0.252*** 
 (0.055) (0.087) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.041 -0.052 
 (0.050) (0.086) 
Lagged DV  0.048** 
  (0.022) 
IMF compliance  0.974*** 
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  (0.363) 
Civil war  0.127 
  (0.227) 
Probability of protest  0.021 
  (0.054) 
Constant -3.133*** -5.258*** 
 (0.997) (1.608) 
   
Observations 1,585 388 
Number of countries 139 75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 6c adds additional control variables. These variables include: leader 
turnover (ARCHIGOS dataset), electoral system (Political Institutions Database), 
independence of the judiciary and freedom of speech (CIRI dataset), and unemployment 
(WDI). IMF compliance remains significant once again showing support for hypothesis 
1.  
 
Appendix table 6c. OLS with PCSE Model 9c 
Non-IMF controls Physical integrity rights 
  
IMF compliance -0.660*** 
 (0.192) 
Probability of IMF exit 1.018 
 (0.646) 
Regular leader turnover -0.049 
 (0.094) 
Irregular turnover -0.048 
 (0.331) 
Assembly elected president -0.269 
 (0.242) 
Presidential system 0.470 
 (1.700) 
Independent judiciary 0.145 
 (0.113) 
Freedom of speech 0.153* 
 (0.081) 
Unemployment 0.002 
 (0.022) 
Population (logged) 0.119 
 (0.701) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.066 
 (0.198) 
Democracy 0.048 
 (0.041) 
Civil war 0.057 
 (0.159) 
Constant 3.849 
 (10.386) 
  
Observations 452 
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Number of countries 77 
R-squared 0.926 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 7c includes a number of IMF controls. These include the size of the loan, 
the time under lending, and the type of loan. Even accounting for all of these IMF 
specific factors IMF compliance still significantly decreases government respect for 
physical integrity rights. Larger loans are also associated with increased repression. 
 
 
Appendix 7c. OLS regression with PCSE Model 10c 
IMF controls Physical integrity 
rights 
  
IMF compliance -0.729*** 
 (0.188) 
Probability of IMF exit 1.221* 
 (0.637) 
IMF loan size -0.162*** 
 (0.049) 
IMF years 0.035 
 (0.026) 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan 0.092 
 (0.347) 
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan 1.079 
 (1.225) 
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan -0.481 
 (1.005) 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan 0.093 
 (0.162) 
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan -0.276 
 (0.234) 
Standby Arrangement (SBA) -0.440 
 (0.330) 
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan 0.248 
 (0.365) 
Population (logged) -0.551 
 (0.795) 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.091 
 (0.207) 
Democracy 0.047 
 (0.038) 
Civil war -0.005 
 (0.156) 
Constant 15.508 
 (12.230) 
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Observations 462 
Number of countries 79 
R-squared 0.928 
Fixed effects YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 8c uses a mediation set up. Model 11c first predicts the probability of 
violent protest. This model is taken from chapter 2. Violent protest is then included in 
model 12c. IMF compliance increases violent protest. It also decreases government 
respect for physical integrity rights. Violent protest similarly decreases respect for 
physical integrity rights. This set up shows the causal pathway from IMF compliance to 
dissent to repression. 
 
 
Appendix table 8c. Mediation 
model  
Model 11c Model 12c 
Negative 
binomial 
regression 
OLS with PCSE 
 Violent protest Physical integrity rights 
index 
   
Lagged DV -0.012 0.153*** 
 (0.055) (0.057) 
IMF compliance 1.085** -0.587*** 
 (0.515) (0.224) 
Violent protest  -0.063*** 
  (0.018) 
Probability of IMF exit -0.516 -2.543*** 
 (0.819) (0.740) 
Total Population (logged) 0.369*** 0.247 
 (0.099) (0.900) 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.028 -0.158 
 (0.104) (0.198) 
Democracy  0.017 0.018 
 (0.027) (0.046) 
IMF years -0.692*  
 (0.355)  
IMF years^2 0.122**  
 (0.054)  
IMF years^3 -0.006**  
 (0.002)  
Protest repression 0.022  
 (0.027)  
Non-violent protest -0.007  
 (0.023)  
Constant -6.218*** 2.158 
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 (1.940) (13.650) 
   
Observations 414 393 
R-squared  0.821 
Number of countries 77 77 
Fixed effects NO YES 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix table 9c disaggregates the Physical Integrity Index into its four components. 
Torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings take on three 
values: 0 (mass violations), 1 (some violations), 2 (no violations). I collapse each of these 
variables into a dichotomous measure since for many of them there are very few 
instances of 2’s (no violations) and this causes problems with estimation. Model 15c and 
16c show that as IMF compliance increases disappearances and extrajudicial killings get 
worse. There is no effect on political imprisonment or torture. This once again support 
hypothesis 1.  
 
Appendix table 9c.  
Logistic regression 
Model 13c Model 14c Model 15c Model 16c 
Torture Political 
imprisonment 
Disappearance Extrajudicial 
killing 
     
Lagged DV 2.922*** 2.953*** 4.312** 1.418 
 (0.511) (0.640) (1.702) (1.657) 
Probability of IMF 
exit 
-8.731*** -4.739 -11.130*** -3.044 
 (3.186) (4.822) (3.678) (5.174) 
IMF compliance -0.307 -1.858 -2.221* -2.962* 
 (0.701) (1.313) (1.204) (1.677) 
Population (logged) -0.130 -0.521 -0.623 -3.258** 
 (0.205) (0.371) (0.459) (1.515) 
GDP per capita 
(logged)  
0.273* -0.053 0.025 0.163 
(0.159) (0.326) (0.313) (0.430) 
Democracy 0.079** 0.252*** 0.242** -0.111 
 (0.038) (0.091) (0.096) (0.160) 
Civil war -0.710 -1.569*** 0.712 0.722 
 (0.516) (0.524) (0.994) (0.780) 
Constant -0.849 9.641 11.113 57.310** 
 (3.524) (6.871) (10.260) (26.378) 
     
Observations 400 398 400 400 
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusion  
 
This project has explored the domestic consequences of compliance with IMF 
austerity. The International Monetary Fund is a powerful International Organization that 
controls hundreds of billions of dollars in funds. The IMF has a massive influence on the 
global economy. Lending decisions and the conditions attached to loans have 
significantly shaped domestic economic policy around the world in the post WWII era. 
The IMF offers advice to all countries and acts a lender of last resort to countries facing 
crisis. Unfortunately austerity conditions attached to IMF loans cause significant 
hardships on borrower countries and may generate human rights violations and violence.  
 Chapter 2 explored how IMF austerity affects collective labor rights. Despite 
increased collaboration between the IMF and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), 21st century program lending still generates labor rights violations. The IMF does 
not incorporate labor rights or any other human rights protections into its conditionality. 
Budget cuts, labor market flexibility, privatization and free trade reforms all work to put 
downward pressure on labor rights and the ability of workers to organize collectively. 
Despite the focus on pro-poor poverty, social welfare floors and domestic “ownership” of 
conditionality, IMF lending seems to have changed little. By measuring and directly 
testing the effect of compliance this chapter has shown evidence that rights violations are 
caused by compliance with austerity reforms. This provides support for past studies on 
the negative economic rights consequences of IMF program lending which have assumed 
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away compliance. The violation of labor rights as well as other economic rights often 
leads to dissent and conflict and this relationship is discussed in chapter 3. 
 Chapter 3 showed how IMF programs generate grievances in society. IMF 
austerity is argued to increase violations of economic and social rights. This is well 
established in the literature and further evinced by the findings in chapter 2. These 
violations push individuals into poverty, threaten their livelihood, and are popularly seen 
as unfair. Austerity places the burden of reform on citizens rather than businesses, 
investors, or the international community. These grievances erupt into violent protest as 
compliance with program lending increases. Violence is large at the start of program 
lending and declines in subsequent years. However, as the consequences of compliance 
are felt and new loans are taken out violence re-emerges. Empirical tests find that 
compliance increase violent protest and that violent protest is cyclically related to time 
under IMF lending. Conflict and violence are two of the largest impediments to 
development and the findings from this chapter suggest that the IMF undermines its own 
cause by instigating violence in borrower countries. Violence is also associated with a 
rise in repression, which is the topic of chapter 4.  
 Chapter 4 tied compliance with IMF conditionality to an increase in repression. 
IMF lending generates increased violations of economic rights. These violations create 
dissent within borrower communities where citizens and elites threaten leader security 
through violent protest and coups. As threats to leaders increase repression also increases. 
Austerity reforms also cut the salaries and benefits of police and the military who may 
use repression to supplement their income or as an emotional response to grievances and 
an increased workload. Budget cuts and the significant number of reforms require leaders 
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to use their political capital to ensure compliance. This leaves them with fewer policy 
tools to control dissent. Repression increases as alternative policy tolls (such as increased 
spending) are taken off the table. Empirical models show that as compliance with IMF 
austerity increases repression also increases.  
 This project has drawn a line from compliance with IMF austerity to labor rights 
violations, collective violence, and repression. Pats work on IMF program participation 
has looked at program lending in the 20th century. IMF arguments that program lending 
in the 21st century are completely different from the past find little empirical support. 
Instead the conclusions generated here show support for past research tying IMF 
programs to economic rights violations, conflict, and repression. These previous studies 
have been criticized for failing to measure compliance with IMF austerity. An alternative 
explanation for these negative outcomes has blamed borrower countries which failed to 
implement reforms and the IMF which failed to cut of lending.  
 The major contribution of this work has been to move this debate forward. 
Compliance was directly measured and used to test these relationships. There may be 
institutional aspect of the IMF as an International Organization that cause negative 
outcomes. Borrower governments are likely also culpable. However, the arguments 
presented here and empirical support for these arguments suggest that IMF austerity is to 
blame for declining human rights respect and increase societal violence. If countries 
implemented a larger percent of IMF conditionality we would see more labor rights 
violations, more conflict, and more repression from borrower countries. Austerity appears 
to be incompatible with human rights and domestic peace.  
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 Human rights violations and conflict are widely agreed to impede economic 
development. The results found here provide one explanation for why IMF borrowers 
have seen disappointing levels of growth. By generating human rights violations and 
violence the IMF undermines its own economic recovery efforts. In any given year, 
between one fifth and one third of countries in the world are under IMF program lending. 
Human rights conscious reforms to IMF program lending could significantly improve 
human rights around the globe and help reduce domestic violence. 
This research has also generated a number of policy recommendations. The 
research tying IMF programs to human rights violations and violence has been going on 
for decades. It is long past time for the IMF as an International Organization that is part 
of the United Nations system to address these violations. Violations of human rights 
during IMF program participation need to be punished. Loans should be cut off when 
human rights are violated in order to comply with reforms. International Organizations 
tasked with protecting human rights and promoting peace should also take a more active 
role in collaborating and providing technical assistance to the IMF. Mission creep has left 
the IMF either unable or unwilling to design conditionality in ways that do not violate 
international human rights law.  
The IMF should re-evaluate the policies attached to program lending. If austerity 
is incompatible with human rights as this research suggests then the IMF should adopt a 
different reform model. Stimulus spending needs to be re-examined in the context of 
economic rights. At the very least budget requirements should require funding for 
education, healthcare, government employment, and social welfare spending remains 
intact. Conditionality could improve monitoring of human rights, suggest ratification of 
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international human rights agreements, and punishment of state agents which violate 
these rights. Lending agreements already incorporate anti-corruption measures and it 
seems a natural next step to include human rights measures as well.  
Powerful member countries which fund and influence IMF lending decisions need 
to take an active role in promoting these reforms. The European Union and the United 
States have historically been the biggest advocates of human rights protections. In the 21st 
century mass atrocities are on the rise and the human rights regime remains vulnerable. 
The rise of far-right parties, xenophobia, hate groups, and attacks on refugees make the 
protection of human rights more important than ever. The US and EU as the largest 
funders of the IMF could help address these issues globally by forcing the IMF to take a 
more active role in protecting human rights.  
Although this research has pushed the envelope there are many questions that 
remain unanswered. Do these findings translate to other types of labor rights? How do 
IMF programs affect the informal economy and individual labor rights? The compliance 
data presented here allows researchers to re-examine other types of economic and social 
rights. If these findings are also corroborated it would be the nail in the coffin for IMF 
efforts to shirk their responsibility for human rights violations. 
A natural extension of chapter 2 would be to explore how compliance and time 
under IMF lending affect other types of dissent including: elections, leader survival, non-
violent protest, terrorism, civil conflict, strikes, and riots. Dissent can take many forms 
and the findings here tell us nothing about these other types of dissent. It is also possible 
that IMF compliance leads to escalations in conflict: from non-violent to violent protest, 
and from violent protest to rebellion. Does conflict spread from IMF borrowers to non-
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IMF borrowers? Does it spread from neighboring IMF borrowers in similar ways as civil 
conflict. Future work should also examine in more detail how IMF compliance affect the 
repression-dissent nexis.  
 Chapter 3 explores physical integrity rights but there are many other forms that 
repression can take. Does IMF conditionality increase preventive repression whereby 
borrower governments expel journalists, round up labor leaders and activists, or create 
curfews and restrictions on freedom of association or movement? Do leaders repress pre-
emptively in anticipation of violent protest; attempting to quash dissent before it 
happens? How do IMF programs affect the ability to cover up repression? For example it 
may be that conditions meant to increase transparency make it harder for leaders to get 
away with repression. It may also be that activists and human rights organizations pay 
more attention to human rights violations under IMF lending given popular beliefs about 
the IMF. In this sense IMF programs may shine a light on violations. 
 All three of these chapters have chosen to use other IMF borrowers as the 
comparison groups. Compliance has varied among borrowers and been used to explain 
differences in human rights and violence while holding other differences constant. Yet 
this says nothing about whether IMF borrowers see higher levels of violations that non-
borrowers. Although the scholarly literature has shown this to be true, exploring these 
relationships with compliance could lead to fascinating research. The findings presented 
here may also vary by regime type, electoral system, region, and income. While these 
variables were held constant in this project they should be examined in their own right. 
What happens when countries exit IMF lending and undergo World Bank lending? What 
explains variation in compliance with IMF austerity? Is it domestic politics, state 
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capacity, human rights obligations, civil society objections, or some other considerations? 
The compliance measure introduced here can be used to test may of the theories in the 
IMF compliance literature. Which policies are generating these negative outcomes? What 
other aspects of IMF lending can help us unpack these relationships?  
This project sees compliance as a first step in unpacking the black box of austerity 
and my hope is that future researchers will build upon this work to answer the plethora of 
questions that remain. It is also my hope that these findings might have a broader impact 
on policy and debates concerning economic reforms and human rights. International 
Organizations will continue to play a large role in global politics. Unless they re-examine 
the consequences of their actions they have the potential to undermine political stability 
and the human rights regime. The IMF has been shown to do just this. There is far too 
much evidence at this point for researchers and the policy community to continue 
ignoring the consequences of austerity. If the 21st century hopes to see the protection of 
human rights and declines in violence then austerity as a reform strategy needs to be 
abandoned or significantly reformed.  
   
 
